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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates three closely related research questions. The first is how de 
facto states make use of minority rights norms to garner legitimacy on the international 
stage. The second is how de facto states’ desire for international legitimacy is reflected 
in legislation relevant to ethnic issues. The third is how the desire for international 
legitimacy – and the legal framework – actually affects ethnic politics and the situation 
of minorities. These questions are explored through a two-case comparative study, 
comparing Kosovo and Abkhazia. Qualitative methods are used to analytically compare 
the two cases with regards to official rhetoric on the international stage, legislation and 
the situation on the ground. It is found that in Kosovo minority rights norms have 
moulded legislation and official rhetoric, but have not penetrated deeply into the actual 
behaviour of policy-makers and have only yielded modest results on the ground. In 
Abkhazia it is found that the norms have had some effect on official rhetoric, but little 
to none on legislation or praxis. In both cases it is observed that international minority 
rights norms are reinterpreted to fit pre-existing, ethnocentric narratives and then used 
in legitimation strategies. It is hypothesized that greater international engagement 
results in rhetoric and legislation that more closely comply with international norms, but 
that this will only translate into praxis in the presence of material incentives. It is also 
hypothesized that norms are more likely to be adopted the more compatible they are 
with pre-existing norms and identities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Legitimacy is vital to all actors in the international system, but it is especially important 
to those polities that lack full international recognition of statehood. Such entities, 
known as de facto states,1 may use legitimation strategies to compensate for their 
questionable status under international law. These legitimation strategies are the subject 
of this thesis. Various scholars argue that in striving for international legitimacy, de 
facto states allow international norms to exert great influence on domestic policy. 
Conversely, other scholars argue that, due to international isolation, de facto states are 
less exposed to international norms than other polities and so develop largely unaffected 
by them. This study seeks to shed light on the extent to which these two camps are 
correct, looking at the nature and effects of de facto states’ normative legitimation 
strategies. 
 
Specifically, this thesis investigates the effect of international norms surrounding 
minority rights, ethnicity and nationality. Some norms, such as the prohibition on 
torture, are codified and institutionalized with a high degree of specificity and are 
openly rejected by very few states, not least because they have the weight of 
international law behind them. Indeed, some such norms have taken on a “common 
sense” quality that means they are seldom even questioned. Compliance with such near-
universal norms reveals relatively little about a polity’s relationship with international 
society. However, the norms surrounding multi-ethnicity and minority rights remain 
nebulous and contested, having emerged relatively recently and not yet having 
crystallized into hard and fast rules. Although increasingly authoritative standards and 
                                                
1 This paper does not seek to take any stance on whether or not de facto states, as defined in Chapter 2.1, 
are in fact or should be considered independent states. For convenience, terms such as national, country, 
domestic, government, border, state, citizen and republic are applied to de facto states without intending 
to comment on their political or legal status. Similarly, for no reason other than to avoid repetition of 
cumbersome formulations like the de facto government of Kosovo, the authorities in Sukhumi, territory 
under the control of Belgrade, Central Serbia and Georgia proper, the term Serbia should be understood 
to exclude Kosovo and the term Georgia should be understood to exclude Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
This allows use of expressions like relations between Kosovo and Serbia and the Georgian-Abkhazian 
border. 
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best practices have emerged and are promoted by influential inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), many states still reject or resist them. As such, diligent 
compliance with the highest standards of minority rights is not just normal behaviour, 
but suggests a desire to be seen as a “model country” or “star pupil” in the eyes of 
international society. 
 
Kosovo and Abkhazia are both de facto states that emerged out of the turbulent 
geopolitical changes that followed the end of the Cold War. This period – specifically 
the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (USSR) – saw an unprecedented 
proliferation of such polities. Indeed, more than half of today’s de facto states originated 
from the Yugoslav and Soviet collapses, as did a number of other such entities that no 
longer exist. 
 
Before 1991, Abkhazia was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within 
the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was one of the fifteen constituent “union 
republics” of the USSR. As of the 1989 census, Abkhazia’s population was 46% 
Georgian, 18% Abkhaz, 15% Armenian, 14% Russian and 3% Greek (International 
Crisis Group, 2010, p. 8).2 Despite making up less than a fifth of the population, 
Abkhaz enjoyed a somewhat privileged status in Abkhazia, recognized as the titular 
ethnicity.3 The 1991 dissolution of the USSR was strictly along the borders of the 
fifteen union republics, meaning that Abkhazia found itself in a newly independent 
Republic of Georgia. Throughout the collapsing USSR, there was greater opposition to 
disintegration among those individuals whose ethnic group was not titular in the 
                                                
2 Throughout this paper, outside of direct quotations, the terms Abkhaz, Georgian, Armenian, Greek, 
Russian, Albanian, Serb, Turk(ish) and Croat are used in an ethnic sense. The terms Abkhazian, Kosovar 
and Serbian are used to refer to the polities of Abkhazia, Kosovo and Serbia and their inhabitants 
regardless of ethnicity or citizenship. In cases where English only has one word, as with Georgian, 
possible ambiguity is avoided through use of phrases such as of Georgia and Georgia’s when referring to 
the country. 
3 An ethnic group is considered titular in a particular administrative unit (or independent country) if the 
unit is named after them and thereby perceived as belonging to them. As such, Abkhaz are titular in 
Abkhazia, Georgians in Georgia. The USSR as a whole was (at least formally) ethnically neutral and so 
had no titular ethnicity. 
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seceding state where they were to live. This was especially pronounced in Abkhazia, 
due to the uncompromising ethnic nationalism of many leaders of Georgia’s pro-
independence movement. Ethnic tensions erupted into violence in the Abkhazian capital 
of Sukhumi in 1989 and then an outright war of secession began in 1992. The war 
ended in 1993 with Abkhazia de facto independent, partially ethnically cleansed of 
Georgians and protected by peacekeepers from Russia. After that, the situation was 
fairly stable until 2008, when full-scale hostilities resumed and, supported by Russia, 
Abkhazia seized territory from Georgia. Shortly afterwards, Russia recognized 
Abkhazia as independent and replaced its peacekeepers with a permanent military 
presence. Since then Georgia and most other states have considered the territory to be 
occupied by Russia. 
 
Like Abkhazia in the USSR, Kosovo was not one of Yugoslavia’s six constituent 
republics, but was instead an autonomous province within the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia. According to the 1981 census, the province’s population was 77% Albanian, 
15% Serb, 4% Slavic Muslim (Bosniak and Gorani), 2% Roma, 1% Turkish and 1% 
Croat (Kosovar Stats Agency, 2008). In the first two decades after the Second World 
War, Serbs dominated Kosovo, while Albanians suffered oppression and discrimination. 
From the late 1960s onwards Albanians received increasing concessions, culminating in 
the creation of significant structures of autonomous self-government in 1974. However, 
rising Albanian nationalism and demands for status as a constituent republic led to 
renewed repression from the early 1980s onwards. This repression intensified under 
Slobodan Milošević in 1989, prompting the start of an Albanian separatist movement. 
This movement established a parallel state within Yugoslav Kosovo, providing 
education and medical care to Albanians, who boycotted Yugoslav institutions. In 1992 
these parallel authorities declared Kosovo an independent state, but they did not enjoy 
de facto territorial control. In the mid-1990s a paramilitary group called the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) started a violent guerrilla campaign, with the ultimate aim of 
unifying Kosovo with Albania. In 1998 the Yugoslav authorities launched a military 
counter-offensive, which allegedly involved atrocities against Albanian civilians, who 
started fleeing Kosovo en masse. In 1999 NATO intervened with a bombing campaign 
that pressured Milošević to withdraw forces from Kosovo. Thereafter, the province was 
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de facto separated from Yugoslavia and was put under the temporary administration of 
the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Although UNMIK was formally neutral as to 
whether Kosovo should become independent or be reintegrated with Yugoslavia (or its 
successor state Serbia), it provided Kosovo with state-like institutions of self-
government, effectively making it into a de facto state. In 2004 there was a brief but 
serious outbreak of violence by Albanians against Serbs. In 2008, after little progress 
had been achieved in negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade, the Kosovar 
government unilaterally declared independence, adopting a constitution based on 
proposals made by UN diplomat Martti Ahtisaari. Kosovo promptly received 
recognition from a large number of Western countries, but not from Serbia or from 
important world powers such as Russia and China.  
 
This paper seeks to address the nature of the two cases’ legitimation strategies on the 
international stage, as well as the effects of these strategies on legislation and on the real 
situation on the ground. On the basis of comparative analysis, various hypotheses are 
offered to explain the similarities and differences between the two cases, as well as the 
discrepancies between rhetoric, legislation and praxis. This research is placed firmly 
within the tradition of the “second image reversed” (Gourevitch, 1978), looking at how 
international factors affect domestic politics and forms of statehood. It also contributes 
to a growing body of literature that takes seriously the internal dynamics of de facto 
states, rather than just treating them as the objects of great power foreign policy. 
Furthermore, this paper not only advances the understanding de facto states, but also 
sheds light on the broader role of norms and legitimacy in the international system. By 
exploring the ways in which international minority rights norms are adopted and 
realized by de facto states, this paper contributes to the important debate about whether 
norms are primarily spread through the logic of consequence (as traditionally 
maintained by rationalists) or the logic of appropriateness (as traditionally claimed by 
constructivists). As much of the existing international relations (IR) literature on norms 
focuses on socialization through membership in IGOs, this is a particularly valuable 
contribution, looking at the way that norms are used for legitimation in the absence of 
IGO membership. This study also has practical relevance, as its conclusions have 
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important ramifications for how best to influence de facto states and, more generally, 
how to promote norms effectively.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical and conceptual 
framework, exploring the concepts of de facto states, legitimacy and ethnic politics, 
before providing an overview of the existing literature on ethnic politics in Abkhazia 
and Kosovo. Chapter 3 briefly outlines research design and method, explains case 
selection and addresses some of the study’s limitations. Chapter 4 is the empirical part 
of the thesis, containing analysis and discussion. Finally, Chapter 5 sums up the study’s 
findings and the implications thereof. 
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2. Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
2.1. De facto states 
 
Greatly influenced by Caspersen (2012, p. 11), this paper defines a de facto state as an 
entity that fulfils the following criteria: 
 
• It has de facto control of territory. 
• The entirety of the territory it controls is claimed by one or more other states. 
• It seeks to build further state institutions and demonstrate its own legitimacy. 
• It has either declared independence or demonstrated clear aspirations for 
independence, for example by holding an independence referendum, issuing its 
own passports or adopting a separate currency. 
• It remains unrecognized by at least one major global power and/or significant 
states in its region. 
• It has fulfilled the above criteria for at least two years. 
 
Although other terms have been used to describe this phenomenon, there is increasing 
acceptance of de facto state as “the most appropriate and most neutral” (O’Loughlin, 
Kolossov, & Tuathail, 2011, p. 2) and the “least inaccurate and least offensive” (Broers, 
2013, p. 69) term available. 
 
According to this definition, as of May 2018 there are eleven extant de facto states in 
the world: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, the Sahrawi 
Republic, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Taiwan, Transdniestria and the “people’s 
republics” of Donetsk and Lugansk. There are also three notable borderline cases: 
Palestine, Iraqi Kurdistan and Republika Srpska. The classification of Palestine is 
complex, as Israel exercises a great degree of control over the territory and, at the same 
time, does not formally claim sovereignty over it. The classification of Iraqi Kurdistan 
and Republika Srpska is muddied by the fact that Baghdad and Sarajevo continue to 
exercise some authority in the territories and the regions’ representatives participate in 
their respective central governments. Such entities as the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
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Levant (ISIL) and Syrian Kurdistan (AKA Rojava) do not satisfy the necessary criteria, 
as they have only ever held limited and unstable territorial control, during ongoing 
warfare, and only developed a relatively weak semblance of statehood. It should 
however be noted that such entities may develop into de facto states, as has gradually 
happened in Donetsk and Lugansk. 
 
The state that claims sovereignty over the de facto state’s territory – and to which non-
recognizing states usually deem the de facto state to belong – is known as the parent 
state. In most cases, the de facto state was formed by secession from this polity. It is 
theoretically possible for one de facto state to have multiple parent states, but in practice 
there are currently no such cases.4   
 
Many de facto states are the result of what Brubaker (1996) calls a “triadic nexus” 
between a nationalizing parent state, a national minority and an external kin state. 
According to Brubaker (1996, pp. 55–56), in many cases where there is a “mismatch 
between cultural and political boundaries”, national minorities find themselves caught 
between two competing nationalisms: that of the state in which they live and that of a 
state to which they “can be construed as belonging, by ethno-cultural affinity”. 
Brubaker emphasizes that a kin state need not be the actual country of origin of the 
national minority, nor must it be considered a homeland by the national minority 
themselves. Rather, what matters is that the kin state’s “political or cultural elites define 
ethnonational kin in other states as one and the same nation” and see them as legitimate 
objects of their state’s interest (Brubaker, 1996, p. 58). For example, throughout the 
post-Soviet space there are large Russian-speaking populations that identify as 
ethnically Ukrainian, but only Russia – not Ukraine – has positioned itself as their kin 
state. 
 
A concept that is distinct from that of a kin state, but with which there is considerable 
overlap, is that of a patron state. A patron state is a recognized state that provides 
military, economic and political support that keeps the de facto state’s independence 
                                                
4 ISIL did have two parent states, Iraq and Syria, but as mentioned above it does not meet this paper’s 
definition of a de facto state. 
 14 
from the parent state viable (Caspersen, 2012, p. 39). The patron state may or may not 
formally recognize the de facto state as independent. In many cases, the patron state 
presents itself as a kin state, building on perceived ethnic, cultural or historic ties 
between itself and all or part of the de facto state’s population. The current cases of kin 
state as patron state are Turkey vis-à-vis Northern Cyprus, Armenia vis-à-vis Nagorno-
Karabakh and Russia vis-à-vis Abkhazia, Donetsk, Lugansk, South Ossetia and 
Transdniestria. However, in some cases (notably Somaliland) there is no patron state 
and in others (e.g. US-backed Kosovo and Taiwan) the patrons are not kin states. It 
should be noted that in the cases of Kosovo and Taiwan, although the United States is 
the primary patron, other states also provide significant support. Kosovo represents an 
interesting case, as a kin state exists (Albania), but plays a relatively minor role in 
supporting the de facto state. Taiwan is also an unusual case in that its parent state 
(China) is the one that that plays the role of a kin state.  
 
Another factor that should be considered in relation to de facto states is diaspora. Not all 
de facto states have substantial diaspora populations, but many do. This includes both 
ethnic kin that have long been dispersed beyond their historical homelands (e.g. the 
Armenian diaspora for Nagorno-Karabakh and the Abkhaz diaspora for Abkhazia) and 
diasporas created recently due to the conflict that spawned the de facto state (e.g. 
Somalis and Kosovar Albanians). In those cases where diasporas exist, they have often 
acted as a significant source of support through such means as investment, donations, 
voluntary work and lobbying the governments of the countries where they live 
(Caspersen, 2012, pp. 59–63). 
 
There is a wealth of scholarship that deals with the particular forms of statehood that 
emerge within de facto states. Within this literature there is a general consensus that de 
facto states’ anomalous position in the international system has an effect on their 
domestic politics and state-building efforts. However, there are divergent accounts of 
what this effect actually is. Chiefly pointing to the case of Somaliland, various scholars 
argue that non-recognition and relative isolation afford de facto states significant 
freedom in their state-building choices (Bradbury, 2008; Eubank, 2012; Phillips, 2016; 
Richards, 2014; Richards & Smith, 2015). This argument rests on the premise that as de 
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facto states lack substantial external engagement, their state-building is not directly 
influenced by foreign experts and advisors. Meanwhile, other scholars argue the 
opposite, that “as places striving for acceptance into the exclusive club of sovereign 
states, de facto states are open to international normative pressure to behave in certain 
ways” (Pegg, 2017) and that this “affects the kinds of statehood that emerge” 
(Caspersen, 2012, p. 51). This argument rests on the idea that de facto states strive for 
international legitimacy as a way to “earn sovereignty” or at least bring about benefits 
short of recognition, such as aid or the development of cultural, diplomatic, economic or 
political ties (Berg & Mölder, 2012; Berg & Toomla, 2009; Caspersen, 2011, 2012, 
2015; Seymour, 2017). 
 
2.2. Legitimacy and norms in international society 
 
In order to understand how exactly the desire for international legitimacy affects de 
facto states, it is necessary to situate the discussion within the scholarship on legitimacy 
and norms in international society. As demonstrated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), 
there is a broad consensus among IR scholars of all schools that norms matter in 
international politics, though there are differences of opinion about the exact effect they 
have and how best to study them. A norm is defined as “a standard of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). In the 
context of international politics, the relevant identity is usually that of a state, though it 
can be a subset of states, for example democracy, European state, developed state or 
great power. In any case, standards of appropriate behaviour are socially determined, 
meaning that states know what is appropriate by reference to the judgements of other 
states. Some norms are institutionalized – for example through an international treaty 
that explicitly spells out a prohibition – but many are not, in which case they may be 
vague and contested. As is highlighted by Epstein (2012, p. 137), the concept of norms 
is not in itself a normative one, meaning that referring to something as a norm does not 
imply approval. 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) postulate that emergent norms are initially promoted by 
“transnational norm entrepreneurs”, who mostly work through non-governmental 
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organizations (NGOs) and IGOs, while more established norms are spread through 
“international socialization”. The former generally requires significant domestic support 
for the norm in question, while the latter does not. International socialization is achieved 
through praise and censure from states, IGOs and NGOs, reinforced by “material 
sanctions and incentives” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Zürn and Checkel 
(2005, p. 1052) describe two main methods through which socializing agents spread 
norms: “arguing” (i.e. explaining why a norm is good) and “bargaining” (i.e. the use of 
“carrots and sticks”). They observe that both methods are used and that it can be 
difficult to discern which is decisive in a given case. Nonetheless, the question of which 
method is key – or, to formulate it differently, “how often actors follow a logic of 
consequences or logic of appropriateness” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, pp. 52–53) – is a 
major point of contention between constructivists (who argue for appropriateness) and 
rationalists (who argue for consequences). 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that one of the main reasons that states cave to 
the pressure of international socialization is a desire for legitimation in international 
society.5 This falls within the “logic of consequences”, but it is not a purely rationalist 
explanation, as the desire for legitimation can be driven equally by material or non-
material self-interest. Material self-interest would be legitimation in the hope of 
encouraging political, economic or military support or engagement from abroad (the 
standard rationalist account). An example of non-material self-interest is the 
constructivist idea that states seek external recognition more or less as an end in itself, 
with no greater goal than affirming their identity and increasing their self-esteem. In 
reality, these two motivations are not mutually exclusive and are difficult to distinguish. 
 
Regardless of whether the underlying motive is material or non-material, Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998, p. 906) suggest that if legitimation is a main driver of norm 
following, we should expect those states whose legitimacy is under question – those 
                                                
5 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 903–904) actually treat “legitimation” and “esteem” as two separate 
phenomena driving socialization, but they do not clearly conceptualize the difference between the two. As 
such, the term “legitimation” as used in this paper encompasses both terms as used by Finnemore and 
Sikkink.  
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who are “insecure about their international status” – “to embrace new international 
norms most eagerly and thoroughly.” Of all polities in the international system, none 
have status more precarious than de facto states. As mentioned above, Caspersen (2011, 
2012, 2015), Berg and Toomla (2009), Berg and Mölder (2012) and Seymour (2017) 
have highlighted ways in which de facto states seek international legitimacy by 
adhering to internationally prevalent norms. 
 
Caspersen (2015) draws a distinction between internal and external legitimacy, the 
former referring to popular support from inhabitants of the polity in question and the 
latter to support from state and non-state actors beyond the polity’s borders. That 
described in the preceding paragraphs is external legitimacy, but internal legitimacy is 
also vital to any regime, not least de facto states. There are two main reasons that 
internal legitimacy is paramount to de facto states. Firstly, if the polity’s inhabitants 
perceive it to be legitimate, they are less likely to emigrate and more willing to defend it 
against possible incursions from the parent state. Secondly, domestic popular support 
for the regime is vital to the central claim of sovereignty as an expression of the right to 
self-determination, thus internal legitimacy will increase external legitimacy 
(Caspersen, 2015). Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) postulate a link 
between internal and external legitimacy in the opposite direction. They argue that 
“states […] care about international legitimation because it has become an essential 
contributor to perceptions of domestic legitimacy held by a state's own citizens”, who 
“make judgments about whether their government is better than alternatives by looking 
at those alternatives (in the international and regional arena) and by seeing what other 
people and countries say about their country” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). 
These arguments are compatible, suggesting that internal and external legitimacy are in 
fact mutually reinforcing. 
 
However, there is also significant potential for conflict between the interests of internal 
and external legitimacy. As Caspersen (2015, p. 191) argues, legitimacy is “a 
multidimensional concept” and “legitimation strategies differ depending on the chosen 
audience”. As discussed above, in the eyes of most foreign states, IGOs and NGOs, the 
main source of legitimacy is adherence to internationally prevalent norms. However, 
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domestic sources of legitimacy may diverge considerably. It is important to remember 
that adoption of a new norm often entails abandonment of an old one, which may 
constitute the loss of a valued identity and so meet domestic resistance (Epstein, 2012, 
pp. 142–143). In addition, adoption of a particular norm may entail any number of 
material disadvantages (for example, compliance with environmental protection norms 
may damage important industries).  
 
Seymour (2017, p. 820) emphasizes that legitimation strategies rely on different norms 
in different contexts, but says that for de facto states the most important norms for 
external legitimacy are those of “liberal internationalism”, which he defines as “rights-
based norms around self-determination, democracy, human rights, international law, 
and an evolving responsibility to protect.” Coppieters (2003, p. 6) is more specific, 
referring to “civic nation-building and minority rights” as key “liberal democratic 
principles” to which de facto states adhere in order to boost external legitimacy. 
Similarly, Berg and Mölder (2012, pp. 527–528) see it as central to “liberal democratic 
legitimacy” that a polity has a consolidated demos (“a population with a shared 
identity”) that is congruent with its population, i.e. that no significant group within the 
de facto state should be excluded from the national community. However, for the 
domestic audience, as well as for kin states and diasporas, a key source of legitimacy 
can be ethnic nationalism (Caspersen, 2015, pp. 187–188). As scholars like Anderson 
(2006), Horowitz (2001) and Smith (1993) have argued, ethnic nationalism is especially 
powerful in the absence of strong, reliable, established state institutions. It goes without 
saying that most de facto states find themselves in exactly such a situation. Moreover, 
the norms relied upon and championed during the period of secession are likely to be 
those of ethnic nationalism, often involving significant animosity towards groups 
associated with the parent state. Considering the premium placed on minority rights 
internationally and the prevalence of ethnic nationalism domestically, ethnic politics is a 
highly contested sphere, experiencing contradictory pressures.  
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2.3. Ethnic politics, minority rights and civic nation-building 
 
Ethnic politics (also known as ethno-politics) is conceived of as a broad sphere 
encompassing inter-ethnic relations, political activity organized along ethnic lines and 
state policies towards minorities, ethnicity and diversity. In societies with low ethnic 
diversity, or where ethnic divisions are of limited political salience, relatively little is 
likely to fall into the bracket of ethnic politics. However, in highly diverse states – and 
in less diverse states where ethnic cleavages are paramount – a wider range of political 
issues are likely to fall under ethnic politics. 
 
Kymlicka (2007) convincingly argues that since the 1980s liberal multiculturalism has 
emerged as a set of international norms. What he calls liberal multiculturalism is more 
or less synonymous with the concept of minority rights, entailing a retreat from the 
homogenizing model of the nation-state in favour of inclusion and accommodation of 
ethnic minorities. Specific manifestations vary considerably between different contexts 
but include such measures as territorial autonomy, language rights and quotas to 
guarantee political representation. Kymlicka argues that minority rights have become an 
international norm that is reflected in the domestic policies of individual states as well 
as the policies and recommendations of such IGOs as the UN, Organization for Security 
and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), EU and Council of Europe. He observes that 
minority rights norms have been institutionalized to a degree through such instruments 
as the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, but that they remain fluid and flexible. As he puts 
it, what is more institutionalized is “a set of minimum standards below which no states 
should fall”, whereas there is less institutionalization as concerns “ideals and best 
practices to which all states should aspire” (Kymlicka, 2009, p. 4). 
 
A related concept is that of a civic nation. This is defined by Smith (1993, p. 9) as the 
understanding of a nation as “a community of people obeying the same laws and 
institutions within a given territory”. It is contrasted with an ethnic nation, which is tied 
together by ethnicity or, in other words, by imagined common descent along with 
language and folk culture (Smith, 1993, pp. 11–12). An ideal-type civic nation is one 
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where individuals of various ethnic backgrounds are all equally considered part of the 
nation. An ideal-type ethnic nation is one for whom ethnic minorities born and raised 
locally are considered foreigners. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and 
India are often cited as classic examples of civic nations, while the Estonians or 
Hungarians might be described as ethnic nations. However, in reality no nation matches 
the ideal type and each case combines civic and ethnic elements to some degree (Smith, 
1993, p. 13). 
 
When trying to capture the essence of liberal multiculturalism, Kymlicka (2009, p. 61) 
focuses on that which it rejects: “models of the unitary, homogenous nation-state” that 
treat the state as “the possession of a dominant national group, which [uses] the state to 
privilege its identity, language, history, culture, literature, myths, religion, and so on”. 
What Kymlicka is describing here is essentially ethnic nationalism. However, civic 
nations are not synonymous with minority rights. As Jackson Preece (2005, pp. 107–
110) shows, while ethnic nationalists see linguistic minorities as alien, civic nationalists 
have historically been just as uninterested in minority language rights, viewing 
linguistic homogeneity as necessary for mass participation in public life. The perfect 
example of this is France, which has professed a staunchly civic official conception of 
nationhood since the Revolution while systematically marginalizing minority languages 
(Judge, 2002). In short, international minority rights norms contain a strong preference 
for civic nationhood, but go considerably further than this, promoting special measures 
to explicitly accommodate minority groups.  
 
The most extensive form of minority rights regime is known as consociationalism. This 
form of statehood is designed to share power between groups (or segments) within a 
state. According to Lijphart (1977, pp. 25–44), consociationalism’s main features are: 1) 
grand coalitions including all segments; 2) a right of all segments to veto; 3) 
proportionality (through proportional representation in elections and quotas in education 
and state employment); and 4) territorial and/or cultural autonomy. Various scholars 
and practitioners recommend consociationalism as the best way to overcome divisions 
in plural or deeply divided societies. Lijphart (1977, pp. 5–6) defines plural societies as 
societies in which political divisions closely follow segmental cleavages (e.g. ethnicity, 
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religion or language) and where important facets of life (e.g. political parties, schools, 
media, voluntary associations) are organized along segmental lines. Guelke (2012, pp. 
30–32) defines deeply divided societies as societies with entrenched segmental 
cleavages that are “recurrent and endemic”, where different segments have fundamental 
disagreements about the legitimacy of the polity and where large numbers of individuals 
“attach overwhelming importance to the issues at stake” and/or “manifest strongly held 
antagonistic beliefs and emotions” towards other segments. Many experts – both 
scholars and practitioners – have come to view consociationalism as a best practice. As 
a result, the consociational model of statehood has had significant influence on post-
conflict state-building around the world, including in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, 
Macedonia, Northern Ireland and Kosovo.  
 
2.4. Ethnic politics in Abkhazia and Kosovo 
 
There are numerous studies focusing on ethnic politics in either Abkhazia or Kosovo, as 
well as some that look at ethnic politics in de facto states in general. This section 
provides a brief overview of the existing scholarship, with particular focus on how the 
overall situation has been characterized in the two polities. 
 
Caspersen (2011) writes about ethnic politics in de facto states in general, making 
reference to both Abkhazia and Kosovo. She argues that de facto states tend towards 
ethnic democracy, a term coined by Smooha (1990, p. 391) and defined as a system that 
“combines the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective 
rights to minorities with institutionalized dominance of the state by one of the ethnic 
groups”. Caspersen (2011, p. 351) argues that de facto states experience a “more 
pronounced” and “more defensive” form of ethnic democracy, due to their precarious 
status and “siege mentality” (Caspersen, 2011, p. 351). As illustrative of this difference 
she points to the fact that in Smooha’s model, all ethnic groups are legally citizens, but 
that in de facto states the question of citizenship is often unresolved. She postulates that 
this ethnic democracy is a result of “countervailing internal and external pressures”, 
whereby internal legitimacy demands ethnic nationalism and external legitimacy 
demands minority rights (Caspersen, 2011, p. 353). Caspersen (2011, p. 352) further 
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argues that de facto states often conceal their ethnic democracy behind a civic façade, 
which results primarily from external normative pressure. She also predicts that as 
international commitment to liberal democratic values falters – and the prospects of 
“earnng sovereignty” reduce – minority rights may be some of the first things that de 
facto states roll back, as doing so bears less risk of domestic backlash than repealing 
reforms that benefit the majority (Caspersen, 2011, p. 352). However, she notes that de 
facto states where the dominant group is numerically weak, like Abkhazia, have an 
additional, internal pressure to accommodate diversity, as they require support from 
minorities for their independence to be viable. (Caspersen, 2011, p. 352)  
 
One of the most comprehensive scholarly works on ethnic politics in Abkhazia is a 
2008 article by Clogg. Clogg provides an overview of inter-ethnic relations, education, 
language policy, citizenship policy, minorities’ political representation and other ethnic 
issues. She also presents the results of interviews conducted among both Abkhaz and 
minorities, investigating perceptions of ethnic matters. She reports that minorities show 
little concern about ethnically motivated hatred or violence, but complain of extensive 
discrimination, including in law enforcement, education, employment and the military 
(Clogg, 2008, p. 317). However, she notes that minorities are sympathetic to Abkhaz 
concerns about the Abkhaz language and the demographic situation and also that few 
non-Abkhaz object to laws privileging the Abkhaz language or barring minorities from 
the presidency (Clogg, 2008, p. 318). Clogg writes that Abkhaz attitudes to ethnic 
issues are primarily shaped by concern for the preservation of their identity, language, 
culture and numerical superiority. As a result, there is a prominent ethnic nationalist 
discourse, which seeks to exclude minorities. However, many Abkhaz see parallels 
between minorities’ desire for rights within Abkhazia and the narrative of Abkhaz 
struggle against Tbilisi (Clogg, 2008, p. 319). Furthermore, Clogg notes that ethnic 
tolerance forms part of the Abkhaz national narrative, linked to the idea of Caucasian 
hospitality, the history of Sukhumi as a cultural meeting point and the fact that Abkhaz 
themselves are variously Christian, Muslim and pagan (Clogg, 2008, p. 319). She 
observes that due to the tension between ethnic nationalism and the multi-ethnic 
population, Abkhaz elites are reluctant to address ethnic issues at all (Clogg, 2008, p. 
322). She also points to Abkhazia’s international isolation and the lack of external 
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pressure to prioritize ethnic issues and adhere to international standards (Clogg, 2008, p. 
321). She argues that the policies that have been adopted are less influenced by Western 
models of multiculturalism than by Soviet-era practices, most notably korenizatsiia 
(коренизация), whereby the titular group benefits from positive discrimination (Clogg, 
2008, p. 322). Clogg concludes that this practice – combined with considerations of 
different communities’ roles in the war of secession – results in an ethnic hierarchy with 
Abkhaz at the top, Georgians at the bottom and others in between.  
 
Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2013) provide another important study of Abkhazia’s ethnic 
politics, focusing on the Armenian community. This work agrees with Caspersen (2011) 
that the term ethnic democracy applies to Abkhazia, especially as concerns the situation 
of minorities other than Georgians. However, Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2013, p. 2089) 
suggest that the policy towards Georgians is less akin to ethnic democracy, and closer to 
ethnocracy. Ethnocracy is a term coined by Yiftachel (1997, p. 507) and defined as a 
regime where “ethnicity, and not citizenship, is the main logic around which state 
resources are allocated” and “the interests of a dominant ethnic group shape most public 
policies”. Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2013, pp. 2089–2090) conceive of the difference 
between the two regime types as being that ethnic democracies are “softer and more 
democratic”, whereas ethnocracies rely more on violence, or at least the threat thereof. 
They believe that both terms are relevant in Abkhazia, but that neither captures the full 
nature of the situation. To complete the picture, on the basis of field research, they 
highlight the fact that Armenians voluntarily keep out of politics, accepting Abkhaz as 
the legitimate “sons of the soil” – i.e. the indigenous, titular, or state-bearing ethnicity 
(Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2091). This is in line with Clogg’s (2008) 
aforementioned observations as well as Ó Beacháin’s (2012, p. 167) findings that 
minorities have no desire for top political positions, as they accept Abkhazia as “the 
land of the Abkhaz”. Ó Beacháin notes that minorities often justify this view with 
reference to Abkhaz having earned their right to political leadership through bloodshed 
during the wars of secession.  
 
In their analysis of language and education laws in Abkhazia and Transdniestria, Comai 
and Venturi (2015, p. 887) argue that the two polities have adopted legislation “with the 
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aim of promoting new state identities, supporting nation-building projects, and 
furthering claims to statehood” and that actual implementation is not its primary 
purpose. In the case of Abkhazia, they argue that the nation-building project is 
fundamentally ethnic and that legislation aims to alter the domestic “language tipping 
game” in favour of Abkhaz (Comai & Venturi, 2015, p. 887). They suggest that the 
degree to which the laws are actually implemented depends on pragmatic consideration 
of what is needed for Abkhazia’s survival: “a degree of internal unity and inter-ethnic 
accord, friendly relations with the Russian Federation, and measures to prevent the 
return of Georgians to the region” (Comai & Venturi, 2015, p. 899). 
 
Despite Kosovo’s lower level of ethnic diversity, there is considerably more scholarship 
dedicated to its ethnic politics than to Abkhazia’s. A great deal of this work assesses the 
success of Kosovo’s minority rights regime as a method of conflict resolution. In this 
body of research there is a general consensus that the measures adopted have yielded 
some positive effects in terms of ensuring minorities’ representation and improving 
their quality of life, but that the policies have simultaneously institutionalized ethnicity, 
entrenched segregation and discouraged the development of a cohesive, civic nation 
(Baliqi, 2018; Beha, 2014; Calu, 2018; Dahlman & Williams, 2010; Jenne, 2009; 
Limani, 2015; Lončar, 2015; Rossi, 2014; Vučićević, 2015). Another recurring theme is 
the discrepancy between inclusive, multiculturalist political rhetoric and legislation on 
the one hand and poor implementation on the other (Beha, 2014; Calu, 2018; Krasniqi, 
2015; Landau, 2017).  
 
Krasniqi (2015) provides a particularly original analysis of Kosovo’s ethnic politics, 
arguing that, as a result of the contradiction and tension between civic and ethnic 
nationalism, an ethnic hierarchy has developed. He situates Albanians at the top as the 
“core dominant community”, dominating Kosovo’s economy as well as central political 
and security institutions (Krasniqi, 2015, p. 204). Next he places Serbs, whom he 
describes as the “core non-dominant community”, benefiting from a high degree of 
political organization and support from Serbia as a kin state, as well as from various 
specific group rights and protections in Kosovo’s legal framework (Krasniqi, 2015, pp. 
204–208). In third place he puts Turks as a “semi-peripheral community” enjoying a 
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special position due to affluence, legal rights, good relations with Albanians and the 
influence of Turkey as a kin state (Krasniqi, 2015, p. 208). Next he places Gorani and 
Bosniaks, as “elusive peripheral communities”, which he says are “caught between 
multiple and often conflicting political visions and interests” and do not benefit from 
decentralization (Krasniqi, 2015, p. 209). These are followed by Montenegrins and 
Croats, the numerically small “unrecognized communities” (Krasniqi, 2015, pp. 209–
210). He puts Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE) at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
dubbing them “invisible communities” due to their almost total exclusion from society 
and in particular from political life. He notes that the Kosovar political establishment 
does not view RAE as political subjects to be engaged with, but as a human rights issue 
to be addressed by IGOs and NGOs (Krasniqi, 2015, pp. 210–211). 
 
Dahlman and Williams (2010, p. 415) are notable for describing Kosovo as an 
ethnocracy, stating that “resources and power are allocated on the basis of ethnicity” 
and that there is “an ethnically defined ruling class in control of state apparatus”. In 
particular, they focus on ethno-territorialism, the idea that territory should be assigned 
to ethnic groups in an exclusive manner. They argue that ethno-territorialism was 
responsible for the Yugoslav Wars and continues to shape Kosovo, specifically 
resulting in Serb enclaves, which they characterize as “an attempt to create localised 
majority territories that invert Kosovar Albanian rule” (Dahlman & Williams, 2010, pp. 
407–408). They claim that Kosovo, as an ethnocracy, uses state apparatus to 
“[reorganize] the political space by ethnically segregating the population, producing 
geographies of discrimination and marginalization” (Dahlman & Williams, 2010, p. 
415). Ultimately, they conclude that territorial segregation serves to reinforce ethnic 
nationalism (Dahlman & Williams, 2010, p. 424). In a slight variation, Baliqi (2018, p. 
65) terms Kosovo a power-sharing ethnocracy. He notes that minorities do play an 
important role in decision-making and are represented in state institutions, but that 
ethnicity is institutionalized and there is no overarching loyalty to the state (Baliqi, 
2018, p. 63). He also argues that Kosovo institutionalizes Serbia as the advocate and 
protector of Kosovo’s Serbs, which he claims undermines domestic inter-ethnic 
dialogue and co-operation and obstructs Kosovar Serbs from developing their own 
independent political elite (Baliqi, 2018, p. 62). 
 26 
 
Rossi (2014, p. 872) describes Kosovo as a centrifugal democracy, a term coined by 
Lijphart (1977, p. 114) and defined as a democracy rendered “unstable, ineffective and 
immobilist” by societal fragmentation. In classifying Kosovo in this way, Rossi (2014, 
p. 872) points to “deep political, cultural, and historical differences between Albanians 
and Serbs” as well as “policies of decentralization that empower the Kosovo Serb 
minority to maintain a functional distance away from Pristina and toward Belgrade”. He 
attributes this ethnic segregation to the very act of Kosovo’s secession, which he argues 
served to legitimize ethnic nationalism in the eyes of all communities (Rossi, 2014, p. 
868).  
 
Landau (2017) calls Kosovo a state of communities, emphasizing that it is neither an 
ethnic Albanian nation-state nor a civic, ethnically neutral polity. As evidence she 
highlights Kosovo’s consistent self-definition as a multi-ethnic state, its extensive 
minority rights, its use of ethnically neutral symbols and its denunciation of both 
Albanian and Serb nationalism (Landau, 2017, p. 444). She argues that this form of 
statehood was adopted as an attempt to gain legitimacy both externally – in the eyes of 
Serbia and the wider international community – and internally – in the eyes of Serbs and 
other minorities. However, Landau argues that this approach has caused a crisis of 
legitimacy in the eyes of a third audience: Kosovar Albanians, who increasingly reject 
the multi-ethnic project and lean towards ethnic nationalism. 
 
Despite an absence of research directly and systematically comparing ethnic politics in 
Kosovo and Abkhazia, this literature review reveals some important commonalities. 
Firstly, the literature unanimously indicates that both de facto states can accurately be 
described as plural and deeply divided societies. Furthermore, although the exact 
classification of both cases is contested – as indeed are the terms of classification 
themselves – there is repeated application of such terms as ethnocracy and ethnic 
democracy. Similarly, both cases are described as exhibiting ethnic hierarchy, with the 
largest group enjoying a privileged, dominant position. Furthermore, ethnic politics is 
repeatedly linked to the question of legitimacy. Specifically, the particular forms of 
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statehood that have emerged are attributed to the tension between domestic and 
international legitimacy. This thesis explores the results of this tension in detail.    
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3. Research design and method 
 
As intimated in the introduction, this thesis seeks to address three closely related 
research questions. The first is how de facto states make use of minority rights norms to 
garner legitimacy on the international stage. The second is how de facto states’ desire 
for international legitimacy is reflected in legislation relevant to ethnic issues. The third 
is how the desire for international legitimacy – and the legal framework – actually 
affects ethnic politics and the situation of minorities. These questions are addressed 
through a two-case comparative study, using the cases of Kosovo and Abkhazia. In 
order to address the three questions, analysis is broken down into three separate levels: 
the rhetorical (Chapter 5.1), the legislative and institutional (Chapter 5.2) and the 
practical (Chapter 5.3). This breakdown allows detailed and nuanced comparison of the 
nature, degree and effect of norm compliance in both cases. Furthermore, discussion 
sections offer hypotheses that might explain the similarities and differences between the 
two cases, as well as the discrepancies between rhetoric, legislation and praxis. As such, 
this is a hypothesis-generating study, providing hypotheses that could fruitfully be 
tested by future research. 
 
3.1. Case selection 
 
In principle a great number of different policy spheres could have been chosen for this 
study, but ethnic politics has been chosen for a variety of reasons. Firstly, this is a broad 
policy sphere with no simple, clear-cut prescriptions, meaning that there is considerable 
scope for international norms to be realized to varying degrees and in diverse ways. 
Secondly, the norms surrounding minority rights are by no means universally accepted 
or commonsensical. This is vital because compliance with deeply rooted, virtually 
universal norms such as prohibitions on murder and theft is quite trivial, revealing little 
about a polity’s relation to international society. However, at the same time, minority 
rights norms do have a fairly broad base of support, actively promoted not only by 
Western actors but also by the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states. This 
means that, unlike such spheres as gay rights, attitudes to minority rights should not 
simply reflect allegiance to a particular ideological-geopolitical bloc. In addition, 
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minority rights represent a hard case, as inter-ethnic relations in de facto states are often 
highly tense and perceived concessions to minorities are likely to be met with 
considerable resistance. For this reason, when accommodation of minorities does occur, 
it is more likely to be due to external influence than to have emerged autonomously 
from within the society in question. Furthermore, ethnic politics in de facto states is an 
important object of study in itself, as minority rights can serve as instruments of conflict 
prevention or resolution.  
 
When studying de facto states, the pool of available cases is quite small. As mentioned 
above, as of May 2018 there are eleven polities that match the definition used in this 
paper (see Chapter 3.1). Furthermore, in order to study ethnic politics, it is necessary to 
choose cases that actually have significant minority populations. Kosovo and Abkhazia 
both meet this criterion: around 13% of the population are minorities in Kosovo (ECMI 
Kosovo, 2013), as are at least 49% in Abkhazia (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2011).6  
 
Furthermore, in keeping with the “most similar systems” research design, Abkhazia and 
Kosovo are similar in other key ways. Most obviously, they are both de facto states, 
meaning they are both hypothesized to have a similar need for international legitimacy. 
Furthermore, they were both formed through violent secessionist ethnic conflict, 
meaning that ethnic questions are sensitive and ethnic nationalism is rife. Moreover, in 
both cases the largest ethnic minority is the parent state’s titular group. Of particular 
importance is the fact that they are both plural and deeply divided societies (see Chapter 
2.3). It is also worth noting that both polities have been de facto independent for a 
similar amount of time: Abkhazia since 1994 and Kosovo since 1999. With Abkhazia 
protected by Russia and Kosovo protected by NATO, neither is under immediate 
military threat. Vitally, unlike many de facto states, Abkhazia and Kosovo both seem 
                                                
6 If, as many have suggested, less than half of Abkhazia’s population are Abkhaz, non-Abkhaz may not 
constitute minorities in a strictly mathematical sense. Nonetheless, for the sake of convenience and in 
keeping with much of the literature on ethnic politics, throughout this paper non-Abkhaz are referred to as 
minorities, as Abkhaz are certainly the most numerous group and dominate the polity. 
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genuinely set on sustained independence, rather than incorporation into another polity.7 
This is important because a polity seeking to join an existing political unit – like 
Transdniestria and South Ossetia, both declaring intent to join the Russian Federation – 
does not have the same impetus to secure international legitimacy as a polity seeking to 
function as an independent state. 
 
By comparing Kosovo and Abkhazia, this paper seeks to address the shortage of work 
that compares post-Soviet de facto states to those in other regions, a gap in the literature 
highlighted by Pegg (2017). This is important because de facto states in the post-Soviet 
space and elsewhere are both instances of the same phenomenon, but for a variety of 
reasons they are subject to quite different external conditions. Therefore this work helps 
shed light on just where the similarities and differences lie. Furthermore, it highlights 
the fact that Abkhazia has an internal life of its own, thereby counteracting the tendency 
of mainstream Western media and political discourses to treat post-Soviet de facto 
states as little more than objects of Russian foreign policy.  
 
Both cases are temporally delineated from 2008 to 2017. To be exact, Kosovo is studied 
from 17 February 2008 to 31 December 2017 while Abkhazia is taken from 26 August 
2008 to the same end date.8 31 December 2017 was chosen as an end date for the simple 
sake of convenience, as this was shortly before work on the empirical part of this paper 
began. 17 February 2008 is a logical starting point to study Kosovo, as this was the day 
it declared independence. From this date onwards, Kosovo is expected to be fully 
committed to pursuing recognition and other forms of international engagement. 
Moreover, although its independence continued to be “supervised” by UNMIK until 
2012, from February 2008 onwards Kosovo’s leaders can be considered essentially 
autonomous actors. 26 August 2008 has been chosen as a starting point for the study of 
                                                
7 A 2010 survey by O’Loughlin et al. (2014, p. 448) showed that in Abkhazia, overwhelming majorities 
of Abkhaz and Georgians preferred independence over union with Russia, along with over half of 
Russians and just under half of Armenians. A 2010 Gallup poll showed that in Kosovo, 81% of Albanians 
support union with Albania, but mainstream Kosovar politicians maintain that unification will only be 
achieved in the form of both states joining the EU (Likmeta, 2010). 
8 Naturally, legislation and institutions introduced earlier than 2008 are still considered if they remained 
in force during the period 2008-2017. 
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Abkhazia, as was the date when Russia formally recognized Abkhazian independence. 
More importantly, by this point the dust had settled from the Russo-Georgian War. 
Although Abkhazia had already declared independence in 1992, the situation changed 
greatly after the Russo-Georgian War of 7-12 August 2008. After this, the UN mission 
in Abkhazia was closed and the chances of Abkhazia being re-integrated into Georgia 
reduced significantly. Of particular importance is the fact that from August 2008 
onwards Abkhazia has enjoyed a considerable degree of existential security. In short, 
the start points chosen mark the geneses of the Kosovo and Abkhazia that exist today. 
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the chosen time limits for this study are not 
meant to be a definitive statement about whether the situation changed fundamentally in 
2008. Indeed, comparison of the situation before and after 2008 is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 
3.2. Method 
 
For each of the case studies, three different features are explored: Chapter 4.1 analyses 
the official discourse about minorities and national identity as directed at international 
audiences, Chapter 4.2 addresses the legislative and institutional frameworks pertaining 
to minorities and Chapter 4.3 addresses the actual state of ethnic minorities. Within each 
of these chapters, the relevant issues are examined for each case individually before the 
two cases are compared and hypotheses are offered to explain the similarities and 
differences. 
 
In terms of method, Chapter 4.1 employs comparative textual analysis. This analysis 
seeks to draw out three main factors, although these are all closely interlinked and 
overlapping and so are not necessarily considered separately from one another. Firstly, 
attention is given to what is said directly about minority rights and ethnic policy. 
Secondly, there is analysis of the representation of the nation, with particular focus on 
the extent to which the national community is constructed ethnically or civically as per 
the categories discussed in Chapter 2.3. Finally, there is analysis of the representation of 
minorities, including the extent to which they are presented as an “other”. The aim here 
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is to reveal the ways that minority rights norms are used in de facto states’ legitimation 
strategies. 
 
Chapter 4.2 involves comparative analysis of relevant legislation in the two de facto 
states. The texts of pertinent laws are summarized and analysed so as to reveal the way 
that the legislative and institutional frameworks address ethnic minorities and their 
interests. As such, this section compares the de jure extent of minority rights in the two 
cases. 
 
Chapter 4.3 analyses and compares the overall situation of ethnic minorities in the two 
cases, on the basis of various indicators. For the most part, this involves qualitative data, 
but, where available, quantitative data and survey results are also used. Factors 
considered include integration, cultural life, economic wellbeing, political inclusion and 
inter-ethnic relations. 
 
3.3. Source selection 
 
As it is analysing official discourse, Chapter 4.1 makes use of texts produced by those 
with authority to speak on behalf of the state. This includes diplomats, individuals 
holding government office and ministerial spokespeople. By extension, this also 
includes texts produced by ministries and government bodies that lack attribution to an 
individual author. However, it excludes opposition politicians and people who no longer 
hold office. Specifically, the analysis is of discourse directed at an international 
audience. As such, the focus is on documents and statements from the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs (MFAs), as well as interviews with foreign media and speeches 
delivered by state representatives abroad or when hosting foreign delegations. One 
strong indication that a text is intended for foreign consumption is if it is produced in or 
translated into a foreign language. For this reason, as well as due to practical limitations, 
only English-language texts are used for Kosovo. The situation is more ambiguous in 
Abkhazia, where Russian is both a local lingua franca and a means of communicating 
with key international partners. As such, for Abkhazia language is a less important 
indicator and both English- and Russian-language texts are used. It is important to note 
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that texts on all topics are analysed, not just texts explicitly relating to ethnic issues. 
Indeed, for analysing the prevalent understanding of national identity and minorities, 
texts that are not explicitly about these issues are in many ways more useful, including 
less self-conscious representations. Furthermore, as one of the key questions explored is 
whether minority rights are invoked as a source of legitimacy, the issue’s absence in a 
text may be just as important as its presence. Practically speaking, texts were collected 
by searching the internet for speeches by and interviews with relevant individuals as 
well as by systematically browsing MFA websites. Collection of texts continued until 
nothing substantially new was being revealed. 
 
Chapter 4.2 makes use of legislation. This includes the constitution and the criminal 
code as well as all laws pertaining directly and indirectly to ethnic issues, particularly 
languages, education, citizenship and local government. Relevant laws were initially 
identified on the basis of the reports used as sources for Chapter 4.3. In addition, there 
was a degree of “snowballing”, as some laws make reference to other laws, which were 
then also consulted.  
 
Chapter 4.3 relies primarily on “grey literature”, i.e. reports by IGOs and NGOs. For 
Abkhazia, this includes reports by the International Crisis Group and the EU. For 
Kosovo, this includes reports by the OSCE, the EU, Human Rights Watch, the Minority 
Rights Group, the European Roma Rights Centre and the European Centre for Minority 
Issues (ECMI). Furthermore, some scholarly sources are used, primarily those that 
include fieldwork. Additionally, some news articles and government websites are used 
to fill in the gaps left by the aforementioned sources.  
 
3.4. Limitations 
 
Direct comparison of the situation in Abkhazia and Kosovo is not straightforward, as 
the data available for the two cases are qualitatively and quantitatively different. This 
particularly concerns Chapters 4.1 and 4.3. As Kosovar officials are much more 
prominent on the international stage than their Abkhazian counterparts, it is 
considerably easier to analyse Kosovar than Abkhazian rhetoric. Representatives of 
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Kosovo frequently make and receive official visits and speak in international fora, 
whereas Abkhazia has few official contacts with anyone outside Russia – and even in 
Russia does not receive a great deal of attention. Similarly, for Chapter 4.3 there was 
generally more and better quality information available about Kosovo. This is 
unsurprising considering the considerable attention Kosovo has received from the rest 
of the world – particularly from IGOs and international NGOs – compared to 
Abkhazia’s relative isolation. In light of these limitations, this paper aims to compare 
the big picture in each case, focusing on general tendencies and the overall situation, 
rather than detailed, direct comparison of specific qualitative indicators.   
 
Another impediment to direct comparison of the two cases is their different cultural and 
historical legacies. This is most marked with regards to Kosovo’s marginalized and 
greatly disadvantaged Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) communities. Like Roma 
and related groups throughout Europe, these communities have a centuries-long history 
of exclusion, discrimination and persecution. In Abkhazia, however, there is no 
significant Roma population or any other ethnic group with a comparable history. It 
would be patently inappropriate to directly compare the situation of RAE in Kosovo to 
that of Armenians, Russians or Georgians in Abkhazia. Nonetheless, RAE are an 
important element of Kosovar society and no consideration of the country’s minorities 
would be complete without including them. As such, issues pertaining to these 
communities are considered, but care is taken to retain awareness of their particular 
circumstances. Indeed, awareness of historical legacies is maintained throughout the 
paper’s analysis and in relation to all ethnic groups.  
  
 35 
4. Analysis 
 
4.1. Rhetoric  
 
4.1.1. Abkhazia 
 
One issue with evaluating the extent to which Abkhazian officials exhibit an ethnic or 
civic conception of nationhood is that it is often difficult to tell whether they are talking 
about ethnic Abkhaz or Abkhazian citizens in a given statement. Although English 
allows differentiation between the words Abkhaz for the ethnic group and Abkhazian for 
the territory and its population (see footnote 2, page 8), this distinction is not always 
maintained, with frequent references to things like the Abkhaz government and the 
Abkhazian language. Furthermore, no such distinction is possible in Russian. The lack 
of careful differentiation between Abkhaz and Abkhazians should be seen as a purely 
linguistic issue, rather than revealing anything in particular about the speakers’ 
conceptions of nationhood. Despite this issue rendering many statements ambiguous, 
there is still a great deal of material that sheds light on the conception of the nation, 
most but not all of which suggests an ethnic perspective. 
 
One of the clearest examples of ethnic nationalism is the frequent emphasis placed on 
fostering connections with the Abkhaz diaspora. For instance, Daur Kove9 speaks of 
“consolidating” the diaspora, “unify[ing] their intentions” and “breath[ing] life into 
them” (Abkhazian MFA, 2017a). One document produced by the Abkhazian MFA even 
lists migration to Abkhazia by Turkey’s Abkhaz as one of the country’s three main 
goals, alongside international recognition of statehood and war reparations from 
Georgia (Abkhazian MFA, 2015, p. 1). Abkhazia’s interest in the Abkhaz diaspora is 
treated as “natural” (Abkhazian MFA, 2017a) despite the fact that most foreign Abkhaz 
are descended from people who left the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, meaning 
they largely lack personal or familial connections to Abkhazia. Although exact data is 
scarce, many sources suggest that the majority of the Abkhaz diaspora do not even 
speak Abkhaz (Danver, 2015, p. 259; Gachechiladze, 2014, p. 81; Rimple, 2014). If so, 
                                                
9 Foreign minister 2016-present. 
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the tie between the Abkhaz diaspora and Abkhazia really is a purely ethnic one and the 
Abkhazian government taking an interest in Abkhaz abroad can only be explained by an 
ethnocentric conception of the state and nation. 
 
An ethnic understanding of nationhood is also suggested by а preoccupation with 
protecting and promoting the Abkhaz language and increasing the Abkhaz proportion of 
the population. For example, Sergei Bagapsh laments that “[w]hen the Georgians were 
here, we Abkhazians only made up 17 percent of the population” (Klußmann, 2009), 
implying that the titular group should make up a greater share. This is also a very clear 
instance of the national “we” being used in a strictly ethnic way. Moreover, the most 
common justification for Abkhazian independence makes reference to oppression and 
even attempted genocide of Abkhaz by Georgians. This narrative typically treats the 
Republic of Abkhazia very much as a state of and for the Abkhaz. However, there are 
instances of deliberately inclusive language, acknowledging the multi-ethnic nature of 
Abkhazia’s populace. For example, it is claimed that the conflict “united the entire 
multinational people of Abkhazia in the face of the common enemy” (Abkhazian MFA, 
2017c). Particularly revealing is the bizarre claim that Georgia “committed genocide 
and ethnic cleansing of the multinational people of Abkhazia” (Abkhazian MFA, 
2017d). This nonsensical application of the concepts of genocide and ethnic cleansing to 
Abkhazia’s whole multi-ethnic population suggests a clumsy attempt to tack inclusive 
language onto a fundamentally ethnocentric argument – that Abkhazia’s secession is 
justified by Georgian atrocities against Abkhaz.  
 
Despite occasional inclusive statements, there are many cases of Georgians in particular 
being excluded from the national community. Georgians are presented as not being 
authentically local, having been “artificially” (Royle, 2016) settled in the region by 
Stalin and Beria as part of a deliberate Georgianization campaign that was aimed at 
disempowering or even destroying the Abkhaz ethnos. At best, Georgians are portrayed 
as guests, welcome to stay as long as they do not claim Abkhazia as “their land” (Royle, 
2016). At other times, Georgians are represented as a security threat and potential fifth 
column for Georgia. In particular, those Georgians who fled Abkhazia during the war 
are presented as having abandoned Abkhazia and chosen to side with Georgia. 
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When directly discussing questions of legitimacy and strategies to increase international 
engagement, there is no mention of minority rights or multi-ethnicity. Daur Kove does 
on one occasion acknowledge the importance of normative legitimation, saying that in 
order to gain international recognition Abkhazia “should become attractive, in every 
sense of the word, to other countries”, including by building a good domestic political 
system (Sobytie nedeli, 2017). In general, however, focus is on non-normative sources 
of legitimacy. One potential source mentioned is Abkhaz/ian history and culture, with 
some statements implying that if foreigners learn about Abkhazia and come to 
appreciate its culture, they will become more sympathetic to its situation. This logic is 
behind efforts to support cultural events among the Abkhaz diaspora. 
 
The most prominent legitimization strategy, however, relies on a narrative of oppression 
under Georgian rule and subsequent victory in armed conflict. For example, in one 
interview Kove says:  
 
“In modern history, we have gained our statehood and independence through the 
lives of thousands of people in the Georgian-Abkhaz war. This is our rightness 
today; the world must hear, understand and accept.” (Abkhazian MFA, 2017a) 
 
References to military victory and to the established fact of de facto independent 
statehood are fundamentally non-normative. Two logics underlie this kind of 
legitimation strategy. The first is the declarative theory of statehood: that international 
society should just pragmatically accept the fact that Abkhazia already is a de facto 
independent state. The second is a conception of earned sovereignty different to the 
usual understanding of the concept: that Abkhazia has earned independence through 
hard work and bloodshed. This idea is in fact antithetical to the international norm 
against violent secession. 
 
However, the narrative of victimhood and oppression is a normative one, with 
references often made to atrocities committed by Georgia and Georgians. One episode 
frequently referred to in this context is the arson committed in 1992 by Georgian troops, 
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burning down the Abkhazian Institute of Language, Literature and History and 
Abkhazia’s main archives. Mistreatment of Abkhaz under Georgian rule is an inter-
ethnic issue, but it is seldom framed in terms of minority rights. Instead it is presented 
as a simple question of violence and aggression. Abkhazian officials do not try to 
present Abkhazia as respecting minority rights in contrast to Georgia’s mistreatment of 
minorities. Instead, they tend to do the reverse, using whataboutism to deflect from 
accusations of mistreating Gali Georgians. In other words, they try to use Georgia’s 
alleged abuses of minorities to justify their own, presenting Georgia as even worse 
rather than Abkhazia as better. Indeed, when it comes to substantive issues related to 
minorities, little concern is shown. For example, MFA statements dismiss out of hand 
the very idea that the closure of crossing points along the Georgian-Abkhazian border 
might be a problem for local Georgians.  
 
There are however some isolated cases of minority rights being used to increase 
legitimacy. For example, a report by Western European human rights experts is cited to 
counter accusations from Tbilisi of violations of the rights of Gali Georgians 
(Abkhazian MFA, 2017b). This is notable as a rare instance of external minority rights 
standards being used as a source of legitimacy. On another occasion, it is reported that 
recent elections “represented an important step towards successful democracy and 
equitable treatment of all Abkhazian residents, regardless of ethnicity” (Abkhazian 
MFA, 2015, p. 1). Similarly, Sergei Shamba10 repeatedly asserts that Abkhazia is not 
following the model of the homogenous ethnic nation-state, but is rather “building a 
civil society” (Carroll, 2011). Bilingualism is presented as “a natural phenomenon” 
(Royle, 2016) and it is emphasized that “[w]e aren’t going to force everyone to speak 
Abkhazian” (Carroll, 2011). Interestingly, Raul Khajimba 11  presents tolerance as 
something historically and culturally rooted in Abkhazia, attributing it to “the ancient 
mind-set of our people” (Royle, 2016). This implies a desire to give the impression that 
Abkhazia respects diversity not because of anything external (such as international 
norms), but due to its own intrinsic nature. In this vein, Khajimba also says that 
                                                
10 Foreign minister 1997-2010 and prime minister 2010-2011. 
11 Defence minister 2002-2003, prime minister 2003-2004, vice president 2005-2009 and president 2014-
present. 
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“Europeans and Americans should learn from Abkhazia” about inter-ethnic harmony 
(Royle, 2016). This would appear to be a repudiation of the minority rights norms 
promoted by international society in favour of some alternative, ostensibly superior 
approach, the nature of which is not specified.  
 
In summary, Abkhazian officials do demonstrate some awareness of normative 
legitimacy and of international minority rights norms, but attempts to employ inclusive 
language are often clumsy and superficial. There is a predominantly ethnic conception 
of nationhood, limited concern is shown for minorities’ interests and claims to 
legitimacy are primarily based on alternative bases, unrelated to good governance or 
human rights. 
 
4.1.2. Kosovo 
 
Kosovar officials exhibit a uniformly civic and inclusive conception of the nation. 
When referring to the national community, they almost always use the inclusive term 
Kosovar, seldom referring to Albanians, other than when specifically distinguishing 
between ethnic groups. Even then, slightly euphemistic language is often employed, 
referring to the majority or the majority community rather than mentioning Albanians by 
name. Officials frequently go out of their way to specify that they are referring to all 
Kosovar citizens, regardless of ethnicity. This all suggests the utmost compliance with 
international norms of civic nationhood. 
 
Most importantly, Kosovar officials consistently and clearly refer to minority rights and 
inclusivity as sources of legitimacy. These form key pillars of a legitimation strategy 
that relies on democratic values. This is most marked with Atifete Jahjaga,12 who often 
mentions Kosovo’s framework of minority rights as a great national achievement and a 
sign of the country’s status as a democracy. She even claims that “to build a democratic 
and inclusive country and to protect minorities” is one of Kosovo’s main goals (Jahjaga, 
2011), illustrating the extent to which minority rights are seen as essential to 
democracy. She also says that ethnic diversity is “one of the largest treasure [sic] that 
                                                
12 President 2011-2016. 
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we have as the [sic] country” (Woods, 2014) and that “offering security and equal 
opportunities to everyone regardless of their ethnicity” is the only way to build citizens’ 
trust in state institutions (Jahjaga, 2013). This latter point emphasizes that minorities 
cannot be blamed for not integrating if the state does not make an attempt to welcome 
them. Although Jahjaga makes particularly extensive references to minority rights, the 
same tactic is used across the board. Even KLA veteran Ramush Haradinaj13 routinely 
refers to inclusivity and minority rights as testaments to Kosovo’s legitimacy, for 
example when discussing the Kosovo Defence Force (Bugajski, 2017; Kosovar PM’s 
Office, 2017). 
 
There are many examples of explicit denunciation of ethnic nationalism. When brought 
up by interviewers, the idea of pan-Albanian unification is unequivocally rejected, with 
Albania referred to pointedly as “another country” (Synovitz, 2012). Ethnic nationalism 
is depicted as backwards and discredited and it is blamed for the violence that the 
Balkans saw in the 1990s. In one particularly illustrative instance, Jahjaga (2013) 
discursively links domestic ethnic diversity with globalization and international 
integration, characterizing ethnic nationalism and inter-ethnic conflict as something that 
prevents progress. She celebrates the fact that across the world “countries and people 
historically divided or left on the outskirts through means of oppression, social tradition 
or prejudice are taking their deserved places on [sic] the table” (Jahjaga, 2013). In this 
statement, she puts the marginalization of minorities in Kosovo on the same plane as the 
marginalization of Albanians in Yugoslavia and of Kosovo in international society. By 
doing so, she draws on the narrative of Albanians’ oppression in Yugoslavia and 
subsequent liberation through Kosovar independence, framing inclusion of minorities in 
Kosovo as part of the same course of progress.  
 
Alleged violations of minority rights norms are also sometimes used to discredit Serbia. 
For example, Hashim Thaçi14 (2015) quotes a Serbian official who called for a “wider 
Christian front” against Kosovo joining UNESCO and condemns the statement as 
                                                
13 Prime minister 2017-present. 
14 Prime minister 2008-2014, foreign minister and deputy prime minister 2014-2016, president 2016-
present. 
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having “clear racist undertones” and stirring up inter-religious hatred. Less pointedly, 
Jahjaga (2011) contrasts Kosovo’s “civic ideas of the [sic] citizenship” with the ethnic 
nationalism prevalent in the rest of the Balkans. This comment can be understood as a 
veiled slight at Serbia, or equally as a way of emphasizing that Kosovo is more 
deserving of recognition and engagement than its universally recognized neighbours. 
 
There are also notable attempts to emphasize diversity, tolerance and inter-group 
harmony as something historically rooted and intrinsically Kosovar, rather than 
something learned or imported. For example, Jahjaga (2011) says:  
 
“We are proud for [sic] our inter-religious tolerance. Kosovo, not only from 
today, not only from the [sic] decade back, but for about centuries back, we have 
the Catholic, Muslim and the Orthodox living side by side, living together, 
respecting their culture, tradition, religions and their monuments.”  
 
This is particularly interesting, as it presents a narrative that tolerance and inclusivity 
are not being fostered due to contemporary international norms, but in fact pre-date said 
norms. To an extent, this contradicts the narrative of Kosovo striving to comply with 
international standards and the association of inclusivity with progress. However, it is in 
line with the linkage of minority rights with Kosovo’s struggle for independence. In 
essence, Albanian separatism is reimagined as a movement to create a civic state free of 
the ethnic nationalism that plagues the rest of the Balkans.  
 
As well as the numerous apparent instances of treating minority rights as a source of 
legitimacy, there are a few particularly revealing comments that directly refer to them as 
such. The best example of this is when Enver Hoxhaj15 (2014) refers to “promoting 
Kosovo as a regional model of secularism and interfaith tolerance” as part of an effort 
“to change the image of Kosovo from a post-conflict place to an attractive place for 
international investments and tourism”. More bluntly and cynically, Ramush Haradinaj 
recounts that “we adopted the Ahtisaari [Plan] hoping this is the last thing and that 
China and Russia will recognize our independence” (Bugajski, 2017). These statements 
                                                
15 Foreign minister 2011-2014 and 2016-2017, deputy prime minister 2017-present. 
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confirm that representatives of Kosovo consciously and deliberately emphasize the 
country’s compliance with minority rights norms as part of a concerted legitimation 
strategy.   
 
When it comes to the discursive construction of minorities themselves, there is no 
significant negativity or othering. Indeed, as mentioned above, non-Albanians are often 
explicitly included in the national community. However, there is a notable tendency to 
treat minorities as somewhat passive, focusing on things done to or for them, rather than 
on their own actions or agency. For example, Serbs are often mentioned as being 
integrated (by the Kosovar state) and are sometimes portrayed as the victims of 
meddling by Serbia, but they are seldom presented as actively integrating themselves 
and never referred to as actively colluding with Serbia. Indeed, the question of 
minorities’ own preferences are often left conspicuously unaddressed, in particular as 
concerns sensitive issues such as “parallel institutions” (see Chapter 4.3.2), relations 
with Serbia and Kosovo’s independence.  
 
Thaçi (2014) provides one of the few examples of minorities’ preferences and opinions 
being directly addressed. He starts by conceding that Serbs “have feared and have 
distrusted the Government of Kosovo, because of everything that has happened in the 
past decades”. However, he goes on to argue that Serbs’ participation in the 2014 
elections shows new willingness to integrate and to accept Kosovar sovereignty. The 
main thrust of his comments is that ethnic conflict is over and that all of Kosovo’s 
communities share common views and a common interest. Specifically, he claims: 
 
“Albanians, Serbs and others all share the same dreams, the same hopes and the 
same rights to a secure future, with a focus towards the economy and the 
creation of new jobs. The citizens of Kosovo today, be they Albanian, Serb, 
Bosniak, Turk or Ashkali, are not interested in nationalistic speeches and their 
old ethnic dreams. They want jobs; they want progress and they want to see 
peace after decades of discrimination, war and uncertainty.” 
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As such, this can hardly be considered an example of acknowledging minorities’ 
agency. Rather, it is an explicit attempt to deny Kosovo’s different ethnic groups 
distinct, autonomous interests and views. Furthermore, in this same speech Thaçi goes 
on to promise to “integrate the Serb minority”, typifying the tendency to treat 
integration as something done by the state to communities, rather than as something 
minorities choose to do themselves. 
 
In summary, Kosovar legitimation efforts make extensive reference to compliance with 
minority rights and official rhetoric is almost totally in line with international norms. 
Respect for diversity is portrayed as something inherent to Kosovo. Empowerment and 
inclusion of minorities in Kosovo and the Albanian struggle against Yugoslav rule are 
presented as two sides of the same coin. Civic citizenship, tolerance and diversity are 
treated as modern and progressive, while ethnic nationalism is associated with 
backwardness and war. In this vein, Kosovo’s purportedly civic model of statehood and 
its respect for minorities are favourably contrasted with allegedly ethnocentric Serbia, 
which did not respect Albanian minority rights in Yugoslavia and continues to block 
Kosovo’s progress as a state. However, despite the inclusive rhetoric regarding ethnic 
minorities, there is a tendency to treat them as mere objects of state policy, rather than 
as autonomous actors with full agency of their own and voices that should be taken into 
account.  
 
4.1.3. Comparison and discussion 
 
There is a clear difference in rhetoric between the two cases. While the Kosovars 
exclusively frame the nation in civic terms, the Abkhazians exhibit a predominantly 
ethnic conception of nationhood. Likewise, the Kosovars regularly mention minority 
rights and multi-ethnicity as testaments to Kosovo’s legitimacy as a polity, while the 
Abkhazians do this occasionally, but mainly build their claim to legitimacy on other 
bases. Abkhazian officials engage in considerable othering of Georgians, consistently 
portraying them as outside the national community – sometimes as guests and 
sometimes as security risks. Kosovar officials do not do this towards their minorities, 
 44 
but they do tend to neglect minorities’ capacity to hold independent views and present 
them as lacking agency. 
 
That said, it should be reiterated that Abkhazian legitimation strategies do exhibit some 
influence of minority rights norms. In particular, when specifically asked about ethnic 
issues, they explicitly reject ethnic nationalism and forced assimilation, just like their 
Kosovar counterparts. They also sometimes go out of their way to verbally include non-
Abkhaz, for example by referring to “the multinational people of Abkhazia”.  
 
Moreover, in both cases there is a similar tendency to appropriate the language of 
international norms for their own purposes. This is exemplified in attempts to present 
tolerance and inter-ethnic harmony as something indigenous. At first glance this appears 
to be a repudiation of the deterministic, primordialist “ancient hatreds” or “clash of 
civilizations” argument often used by ethnic nationalists to present inter-ethnic conflicts 
as deep-rooted or even inevitable. However, inter-ethnic harmony is presented as 
natural to Kosovo and Abkhazia, rather than to the entire regions of the Balkans or the 
Caucasus. As such, it seems that the real purpose is to suggest that bad, aggressive 
ethnic nationalism is the exclusive domain of the parent state and thereby to further a 
narrative of innocence and victimhood. In this way, the ancient hatreds narrative is not 
so much rejected as repackaged: we have an ancient tolerance for diversity; they have an 
ancient hatred for us. In line with this, in neither case is there any denunciation of the 
ethnic nationalism that resulted in secession. Rather than addressing the roles played by 
Albanian and Abkhaz nationalism in the separatist movements, officials reimagine the 
ethnic secessionist conflict as one against ethnic nationalism and in favour of diversity 
and inter-ethnic harmony. The essential idea of secession as an expression of national 
self-determination remains, but the identity of the nation in whose name independence 
was sought is modified to nominally include minorities, despite their actual absence 
from the separatist movements.  
 
This means that in both cases, rather than an outright abandonment of ethnic 
nationalism in favour of inclusivity, the rhetoric in fact reflects an amalgamation of the 
ethnocentric logic of secession and the internationally legitimate norms of multi-
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ethnicity. This is certainly more obvious in Abkhazia, where ethnocentric views are 
clearly voiced and attempts at co-opting inclusive language are often heavy-handed or 
superficial. In Kosovo, the language of minority rights is used much more thoroughly 
and consistently, but the absence of a truly inclusive perspective is revealed by the lack 
of acknowledgement of non-Albanians having their own views.  
 
When forming hypotheses to explain the different extents to which Abkhazian and 
Kosovar rhetoric conforms to international norms, it is instructive to consider the four 
variables that Zürn and Checkel (2005, p. 1055) identify as affecting whether norms are 
adopted. These are: 1) properties of the socializers, 2) properties of the socialized, 3) 
properties of the norms, and 4) properties of the interaction between socializers and 
socialized. For both cases studied here, factors 1 and 3 are the same: the norms are those 
pertaining to minority rights, as described in Chapter 2.3, and the socializer is 
international society as a whole, epitomized in the UN, the OSCE, the EU and the 
Council of Europe. This means that, although the cases are selected for similarity, the 
differences in rhetoric should be explicable with reference to either the properties of the 
socialized or the interaction between socialized and socializers. 
 
The greatest and most relevant difference is to be found in the relationship between the 
socializers and the socialized, i.e. the level and nature of international engagement. 
Kosovo has received extensive attention from IGOs, NGOs and states around the world. 
Although it is not a member of the main norm-promoting organizations, these 
organizations have all been very active on its territory. Furthermore, Kosovo has been a 
member of the IMF and the World Bank since 2009, of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development since 2012 and of the Council of Europe 
Development Bank since 2013. Moreover, as an aspiring EU member, Kosovo is 
subject to the normative pressure of accession conditionality. In Abkhazia, on the other 
hand, few foreign NGOs operate and there has been no UN or OSCE presence since 
2009. Abkhazia does not even permit the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia to enter its 
territory. Abkhazia is also excluded from Russia-led organizations like the Eurasian 
Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States. On the question of international isolation, it is instructive to refer 
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to the normalization index developed by Berg and Toomla (2009, pp. 30–43), which 
compares the level of international integration of de facto states. On a ten-point scale, 
where 10 is the most integrated and 0 is the most isolated, they give Kosovo a score of 
8.2 (“quasi-recognition”) and Abkhazia a score of 4.5 (“boycott”). Although the index 
was compiled in August 2009, early in the period with which this paper is concerned, it 
is still relevant. Indeed, if the index were made again for 2017, the contrast between the 
two would probably be even greater, as since 2009 Kosovo has certainly become more 
integrated, while Abkhazia’s situation has not changed significantly. 
 
In light of this, it is hypothesized that greater international engagement results in 
rhetoric that more closely complies with international norms. There are two 
mechanisms that might explain this causal link. Firstly, the greater level of interaction 
with external actors should increase local politicians’ familiarity with the norms in 
question, enhancing their ability to use compliance as a legitimation strategy. Secondly, 
the greater prospects of material reward (e.g. grants, investment, EU membership) 
should increase the polity’s incentive to use compliance as a legitimation strategy.  
These hypotheses are in line with the views of Clogg (2008), Bradbury (2008), Eubank 
(2012), Philips (2016) and Richards (2014) that norm compliance depends on active 
socialization. 
 
A further factor of relevance, concerning the nature of the socialized, is the extent to 
which the discourse of minority rights is compatible with the pre-existing conflict 
narrative. In Kosovo, the prevailing narrative among Albanians has always been that 
their separatism was a reaction to being treated as inferior to Yugoslavia's other 
ethnicities and in particular to repression under Milošević. As their secession was 
caused by the denial of rights to them as a minority, it is relatively easy for Kosovar 
Albanians to frame themselves as committed to minority rights. In Abkhazia, on the 
other hand, the narrative of minority rights does not fit as well, considering that 
Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia respected the region’s autonomy and allowed 
Abkhaz to dominate regional government much more than their population size 
justified. This is in line with Epstein’s (2012) argument that receptiveness to new norms 
is shaped by a polity’s prior norms and identities. 
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The importance of prior norms and identities is also useful for explaining why, even in 
Kosovo, there are remnants of ethnocentrism in rhetoric. The ideal of national self-
determination, the victimhood narrative and the narrative of longstanding conflict with 
the parent state remain paramount, overriding any other consideration or norm. As such, 
minority rights norms are adopted to complement and contribute to these existing 
narratives, not to replace them outright. This explains why tolerance is presented as 
historically rooted and used to show normative superiority to the parent state. Likewise, 
fully acknowledging minorities’ views and treating them as autonomous political 
subjects, while in line with the values of inclusivity, would be contrary to the idea of 
independence as an expression of unanimous, civic national self-determination, as in 
reality many minorities favour union with the parent state. 
 
4.2. Legislation and institutions 
 
4.2.1. Abkhazia 
 
Abkhazia’s constitution mostly takes an ethnically neutral tone, neither providing 
extensive minority rights nor elevating the Abkhaz to any kind of special status. In other 
words, the constitution only complies with the most basic liberal democratic norms vis-
à-vis minorities, guaranteeing freedom to speak ones native language (Article 6, 
Abkhazian constitution, 1994), freedom of religion (Article 14, Abkhazian constitution, 
1994) and equality before the law (Article 12, Abkhazian constitution, 1994). Indeed, 
the constitution does not specifically mention of any of Abkhazia’s ethnic communities 
other than the Abkhaz. There is provision for local self-government, but this is quite 
limited and lacks any apparent intention to grant ethnic communities control over their 
own affairs (Chapter 6, Abkhazian constitution, 1994). 
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At least formally, the constitution professes a civic conception of the nation, stating: 
 
“The sovereignty bearer and sole source of authority in the Republic of 
Abkhazia shall be its people, i.e., the citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia.” 
(Article 2, Abkhazian constitution, 1994) 
 
However, this is undermined by the fact that Abkhaz is named the sole “official 
language”, with no mention made of any other language except Russian, which is 
recognized as a language of “state and other institutions”, a status at least symbolically 
inferior to that of Abkhaz (Article 6, Abkhazian constitution, 1994). An even more 
striking exception to the constitution’s ethnic neutrality is found in Article 49, which 
violates even the most minimal conception of minority rights by specifying that the 
president must be of Abkhaz ethnicity. 
 
The constitution also contains a ban on “the incitement of social, racial, national and 
religious discord”, the purpose of which is somewhat ambiguous (Article 18, Abkhazian 
constitution, 1994). It resembles a provision against hate speech, which would be an 
important instance of compliance with minority rights norms. However, the fact that it 
concerns “discord” rather than hatred or violence suggests that it was intended less to 
protect minorities than to restrict their freedom to organize politically or make demands. 
This would follow the precedent of similar laws in authoritarian post-Soviet states, used 
to silence separatist minorities and other critics of the regime (for an example from 
Kazakhstan, see Human Rights Watch, 2016). 
 
In keeping with the constitution, the Law on the State Language gives an unequivocally 
privileged position to Abkhaz, while providing considerable scope for use of Russian 
but affording little space for other languages. Indeed, the legislation’s main purpose 
seems to be strengthening the position of Abkhaz and reducing the use of other 
languages. The document starts by reiterating Article 6 of the constitution: that Abkhaz 
is the “state language” while Russian and Abkhaz are both “recognized as languages of 
state and other institutions” (Article 2, Abkhazian language law, 2007). The rest of the 
document essentially explains what this means in practice. Several articles focus on 
 49 
ways in which the state will encourage the study, preservation and development of 
Abkhaz, a preoccupation that strongly suggests an ethnic conception of the nation, but 
which is not contrary to international norms per se.  
 
The language law is most strident in privileging Abkhaz on issues of primarily symbolic 
value. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the requirement that in all official 
documents, personal names must be written in Cyrillic in accordance with Abkhaz 
spelling rules (Article 12, Abkhazian language law, 2007). Toponyms on signs must be 
in Abkhaz, with additional Russian and English optional (Article 18, Abkhazian 
language law, 2007). Private businesses’ advertisements, signs and promotional 
materials should be “predominantly” in Abkhaz (Article 17, Abkhazian language law, 
2007). Labels, instructions and prices on domestically produced goods must be in 
Abkhaz and may also have Russian and English, as long as Abkhaz is more prominent 
(Article 17, Abkhazian language law, 2007). 
 
On more substantive issues, there is a greater degree of pragmatism, with Russian 
generally enjoying equal status to Abkhaz, although always mentioned secondarily. At 
the same time, there is no scope for the use of other languages, even where one might 
expect language to be unregulated. All state enterprises, institutions and organizations 
should conduct business in Abkhaz if possible, but may use Russian if necessary 
(Article 11, Abkhazian language law, 2007). Legislation and official state documents 
such as passports and birth certificates must all be published in both Abkhaz and 
Russian (Articles 9 and 12, Abkhazian language law, 2007). Abkhaz and Russian are 
the languages of court proceedings, the military and all government ministries (Articles 
14 and 8, Abkhazian language law, 2007). It is even stipulated that service industries 
and commerce should conduct business in Abkhaz or Russian (Article 17, Abkhazian 
language law, 2007).  
 
However, there are some substantive provisions that greatly privilege Abkhaz. Most 
strikingly, it is mandatory for heads of state organs, heads of local administration and 
members of parliament to know and use Abkhaz (Article 2, Abkhazian language law, 
2007). This would seem to totally exclude the vast majority of non-Abkhaz – and 
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indeed many Abkhaz – from political participation. Furthermore, Article 8 stipulates 
that parliament and the cabinet must conduct business in Abkhaz, though it also states 
that simultaneous translation should be provided to and from Russian for any 
participants who request it. Another highly exclusionary, if somewhat ambiguous, 
clause is found in Article 2, which states that Abkhazian citizens “should know the state 
language of the Republic of Abkhazia”. It is unclear whether this is supposed to imply 
that knowledge of Abkhaz is a precondition for citizenship or whether it is simply a 
statement of intent to promote study of the language. In either case, it puts a burden on 
minorities to learn Abkhaz without similarly requiring Abkhaz to learn any other 
language. Other particularly restrictive requirements are those that pertain to the media. 
Any print media published in Abkhazia must have at least half of its content in Abkhaz 
– or two thirds if it is a state-owned publication – while all radio broadcast domestically 
must have two thirds of its content in Abkhaz, with the exception of programming and 
music produced abroad (Article 16, Abkhazian language law, 2007). In short, these 
provisions all fly in the face of the spirit of minority rights. 
 
The language law does however provide some rights and protections for speakers of 
languages other than Abkhaz and Russian. Firstly, the basic right to use any language is 
protected for “informal inter-personal relations” and “social and religious associations 
[and] congregations” (Article 1, Abkhazian language law, 2007). Similarly, when 
stipulating that service industries and commerce should use Abkhaz or Russian, Article 
17 also specifies that service cannot be denied to customers on the grounds of not 
knowing these languages. There are also some exceptions to the rules on language in the 
media for ethnic minority organizations, although it is not clear how these organizations 
are defined (Article 16, Abkhazian language law, 2007). These meagre protections can 
however hardly be considered minority rights.  
 
More substantially, participants in court proceedings who do not speak the language of 
court have the right to an interpreter and translation of relevant documents (Article 14, 
Abkhazian language law, 2007) and ethnic organizations have the right to form pre-
schools and cultural institutions that use their ethnic languages (Article 7, Abkhazian 
language law, 2007). The most generous linguistic right afforded to minorities pertains 
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to education. In addition to being “guaranteed” education in Abkhaz or Russian, school-
aged Abkhazians “have the right to” education in the language of their choice, within 
the bounds of what can be offered by the education system (Article 7, Abkhazian 
language law, 2007). These provisions are in fact very generous, bestowing 
considerable minority rights in line with international best practices. However, it should 
be noted that the vague proviso about minority-language education only being provided 
if possible leaves the possibility of minority-language institutions being closed down 
under a pretext such as lack of funds. 
 
Probably the most ethnocentric piece of Abkhazian legislation is the 2005 Law on 
Citizenship, which clearly applies separate standards to Abkhaz and other ethnicities. 
The law’s preface sets the tone, declaring that members of the Abkhaz and Abazin16 
diasporas have a right to “return” to Abkhazia. This is realized through Article 5, which 
bestows automatic citizenship on all Abkhaz and Abazins, regardless of their place of 
residence and whether they hold other citizenships. In contrast, people of other 
ethnicities are only automatic citizens if they had been resident in Abkhazia for five 
years as of 12 October 1999 and if they hold no other citizenship (Article 5, Abkhazian 
citizenship law, 2005). Indeed, other than for Abkhaz and Abazins, the only form of 
dual citizenship permitted is Abkhazian-Russian (Article 6, Abkhazian citizenship law, 
2005). Citizenship is acquired at birth primarily on the basis of jus sanguinis: if both 
parents are Abkhazian citizens, the child is too regardless of place of birth; if one parent 
is an Abkhazian citizen and the other is not, the child is only a citizen if born in 
Abkhazia (Article 12, Abkhazian citizenship law, 2005). All those not within the 
categories already mentioned – including those born in Abkhazia to two parents without 
Abkhazian citizenship – must go through a naturalization process if they wish to 
become Abkhazian citizens. To be eligible for naturalization one must ordinarily have 
lived in Abkhazia at least 10 uninterrupted years since receiving permanent residency 
(вид на жительство) and must speak Abkhaz (Article 13, Abkhazian citizenship law, 
                                                
16 Abazins (also known as Abaza) are an ethnic group closely related to Abkhaz, who resided in what is 
now western Abkhazia up until the 14th or 15th century, when they migrated northwards to today’s Russia. 
In the 19th century, along with many Abkhaz, they migrated en masse to the Middle East. Today 
significant populations remain in Russia, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (Tishkov, 1994).  
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2005). It should also be noted that citizenship can be denied to anyone who has acted 
against the “sovereign status of the Republic of Abkhazia”, which presumably includes 
anyone who served in the Georgian army during the wars (Article 16, Abkhazian 
citizenship law, 2005). This legislation seems to be designed to actively prevent 
minorities from attaining full political rights and ultimately to discourage non-Abkhaz 
from living in Abkhazia. Moreover, making citizenship more easily accessible to some 
ethnicities than to others fundamentally undermines any commitment to building a civic 
nation. 
 
As the citizenship law is likely to deprive many non-Abkhaz of citizenship, it is also 
relevant to consider the 2016 Law on Foreign Citizens. According to this law, various 
categories of person are eligible for a temporary residency permit (разрешение на 
временное проживание). The clause most relevant to local ethnic minorities is the one 
stating that anyone “born in the Abkhaz ASSR and permanently residing in the 
Republic of Abkhazia for no less than five years” can receive temporary residency 
(Article 7, Abkhazian law on foreign citizens, 2016). This permit is valid for up to 4 
years and can be renewed an unlimited number of times. Permanent residency (вид на 
жительство) is only available to those married to Abkhazian citizens and to “stateless 
persons born in the Abkhaz ASSR and permanently residing in the Republic of 
Abkhazia for no less than 10 years since 12 October 1999” (Article 10, Abkhazian law 
on foreign citizens, 2016). In other words, most non-citizens resident in Abkhazia have 
no prospect of permanent residency and therefore no prospect of naturalization. It 
should also be noted that both forms of residency will be denied or revoked if the holder 
or applicant has campaigned against the “independence and state sovereignty of the 
Republic of Abkhazia”, or if in the 1992-3 war they fought against the Abkhazian 
separatists or collaborated with the “occupying regime” (Article 9, Abkhazian law on 
foreign citizens, 2016). This would presumably prevent the return of any Georgians 
who performed mandatory military service during the war and certainly restricts the 
political activity of anyone who favours union with Georgia. 
 
In addition to being unable to vote or run for public office (Article 17, Abkhazian law 
on foreign citizens, 2016), those without Abkhazian citizenship are forbidden from 
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working for the government, crewing a ship flying the Abkhazian flag, piloting an 
aeroplane or holding any job related to national security (Article 18, Abkhazian law on 
foreign citizens, 2016). Furthermore, they are only able to work in the district specified 
on their residency permit, making them unable to travel throughout Abkhazia in search 
of work (Article 14, Abkhazian law on foreign citizens, 2016). Another inconvenience 
is that all those without Abkhazian citizenship must report to the authorities annually to 
confirm that they are still living in Abkhazia (Articles 7 and 10, Abkhazian law on 
foreign citizens, 2016). 
 
Abkhazia totally lacks any law on discrimination (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 26), 
let alone any legislation specifically creating minority rights. Nor are there any state 
bodies or government posts dedicated to minority issues. The closest to this is the 
Ombudsman for Human Rights, a position created in February 2016 and first filled nine 
months later (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 27). The Ombudsman can receive 
complaints about human rights abuses from anyone resident in Abkhazia, regardless of 
citizenship. 
 
In summary, Abkhazia’s legal framework is somewhat mixed with regards to minority 
rights. In general, it shows little influence of international norms. A great deal of 
legislation is highly ethnocentric, privileging Abkhaz and Abazins, especially on 
symbolic issues. However, ethnocentrism is moderated somewhat by extensive 
recognition of Russian as Abkhazia’s second language. Furthermore, the law pertaining 
to education stands in stark contrast to most of Abkhazia’s legislation and is in fact in 
line with internationally recommended best practices.  
 
4.2.2. Kosovo 
 
From the point of view of minority rights, Kosovo’s legal framework is one of the most 
generous in the world. The constitution frames the nation in explicitly civic and 
inclusive terms, with its preamble expressing determination to build a “country that will 
be a homeland to all of its citizens” and its third article declaring that the “Republic of 
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Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities”.17 The 
rhetorical commitment to multi-ethnicity does not stop there, with clauses mentioning 
the right of minorities to “freely express, foster and develop their identity and 
community attributes” (Article 57, Kosovar constitution, 2008) and to “preserve, protect 
and develop their identities” (Article 58, Kosovar constitution, 2008). Acknowledging 
the fraught nature of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo’s post-conflict society, there is 
also a commitment to “promote a spirit of tolerance [and] dialogue and [to] support 
reconciliation among communities” (Article 58, Kosovar constitution, 2008). 
 
The laws relating to citizenship are among the most important, laying the groundwork 
for a civically defined nation. Citizenship is automatically granted to all those who were 
legally resident in Kosovo on 15 June 2008, as well as “all citizens of the former 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia habitually residing in Kosovo on 1 January 1998 and 
their direct descendants”, “regardless of their current residence and of any other 
citizenship they may hold” (Article 155, Kosovar constitution, 2008). These terms are 
quite broad and inclusive, guaranteeing citizenship to those of all ethnicities who left 
Kosovo due to the war. In the same vein, there is a commitment to “promote and 
facilitate the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons and 
assist them in recovering their property” (Article 156, Kosovar constitution, 2008). 
Importantly, there is a clear and unconditional protection of the right to dual citizenship 
(Article 3, Kosovar citizenship law, 2008). Furthermore, for those born after the 
declaration of independence, both jus sanguinis and jus solis apply (Articles 5-6, 
Kosovar law on special protective zones, 2008)(Articles 5-6, Kosovar law on special 
protective zones, 2008)(Articles 5-6, Kosovar law on special protective zones, 
2008)(Articles 5-6, Kosovar law on special protective zones, 2008)(Articles 5-6, 
Kosovar law on special protective zones, 2008)(Articles 3, 6 and 7, Kosovar citizenship 
law, 2008). Naturalization usually requires five years residence in Kosovo and proof of 
                                                
17 The Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members in Kosovo 
(henceforth “the communities law”) recognizes seven ethnic minorities: Serbs, Turks, Bosniaks, Roma, 
Ashkali, Egyptians and Gorani (Article 1.4, Kosovar communities law, 2008). In addition, it specifies that 
Albanians in municipalities where they constitute a minority shall also benefit from minority rights 
(Article 1.4, Kosovar communities law, 2008). 
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integration into society, as well as sufficient finances and elementary knowledge of 
either Albanian or Serbian (Article 10, Kosovar citizenship law, 2008). So as to 
facilitate naturalization of those who left Kosovo before, during and after the war, the 
law extends the right to Kosovar citizenship to anyone born in Kosovo – or who has a 
parent born in Kosovo – who maintains family links there (Article 13, Kosovar 
citizenship law, 2008). By international standards, these laws are very inclusive. 
 
Perhaps the most elaborate minority rights are those pertaining to government, which 
are clearly based on consociationalism. In parliament, 20 of the 120 seats are reserved 
for minorities: ten for Serbs, four for RAE, three for Bosniaks, two for Turks and one 
for Gorani (Article 64, Kosovar constitution, 2008). Furthermore, constitutional 
amendments require not only a two-thirds majority of the whole parliament, but also a 
two-thirds majority of the twenty minority representatives (Article 65, Kosovar 
constitution, 2008). Likewise, legislation pertaining to certain issues, such as languages, 
education, religion, cultural heritage, education and municipal boundaries, must be 
passed not only by a parliamentary majority, but also a majority of the twenty minority 
members of parliament (MPs) (Article 81, Kosovar constitution, 2008). There also has 
to be at least one deputy president, one minister and two deputy ministers from the Serb 
community and one deputy president, one minister and two deputy ministers from other 
minorities (Articles 67 and 96, Kosovar constitution, 2008). Within parliament there is a 
Committee on Rights and Interests of Communities – composed of one third Albanians, 
one third Serbs and one third others – which should review legislation (Article 78, 
Kosovar constitution, 2008). Outside parliament, there is a Consultative Council for 
Communities (CCC), which should “provide a mechanism for regular exchange” 
between minorities and the government (Article 60, Kosovar constitution, 2008).  
 
Further in line with consociationalism, ethnic quotas extend beyond parliament. There is 
a strict quota for at least 15% of judges to be non-Albanians (Article 103, Kosovar 
constitution, 2008) and judges in courts serving Serb-majority municipalities are only 
appointed by Serb MPs (Article 108, Kosovar constitution, 2008). Of the Central 
Election Commission’s ten members, one is appointed by Serb MPs and three are 
appointed by other non-Albanian MPs (Article 139, Kosovar constitution, 2008). 
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Minorities are “entitled to equitable representation in employment at all levels in 
publicly owned enterprises and public institutions” (Article 9.5, Kosovar communities 
law, 2008). It is also required that minorities be “adequately represented on the 
regulatory bodies relating to the media” and “appointed to the Independent Media 
Commission in consultations with community representative organizations” (Article 
6.7, Kosovar communities law, 2008). It is further specified that if minorities “find it 
difficult to meet standards for admission to positions in public services, including in 
particular higher-level positions, special measures shall be provided” (Article 9.6, 
Kosovar communities law, 2008). This seems to imply affirmative action. 
 
Kosovo’s legislation on local self-government is also very relevant to the question of 
minority rights. In line with consociationalism, Kosovar municipalities effectively 
provide a degree of local autonomy for territorially concentrated ethnic groups, with 
many municipal borders having been deliberately drawn to match ethnic distribution 
(Krasniqi, 2015, p. 206). Although Kosovo is a unitary state, municipalities have 
extensive competencies, realized through directly elected municipal assemblies and 
mayors (Articles 17-18, 35 and 56, Kosovar local government law, 2008). In addition, 
the Serb-majority municipalities of North Mitrovica, Gračanica and Štrpce have extra 
competencies for provision of secondary health care, while all Serb-majority 
municipalities have enhanced competencies in cultural affairs and “enhanced 
participatory rights in the selection of the local station police commanders” (Articles 20 
and 22-23, Kosovar local government law, 2008). Kosovar municipalities have the right 
to co-operate and form partnerships with one another and with local government bodies 
abroad (Articles 28 and 30, Kosovar local government law, 2008). Specifically, 
municipalities may co-operate with “municipalities and institutions, including 
government agencies, in the Republic of Serbia”, including receipt of “financial and 
technical assistance, [...] expert personnel and equipment” (Article 30, Kosovar local 
government law, 2008). This is a particularly notable provision, helping Serbs maintain 
links with their kin state. 
 
However, municipalities are not defined as being of or for particular ethnicities and the 
Law on Local Self-Government includes extensive protection for those groups that form 
 57 
minorities within a municipality. Each municipal assembly includes a “communities 
committee”, composed of assembly members along with community representatives, 
which has the task of “review[ing] all municipal policies, practices and activities” to 
“ensure that rights and interests of the Communities are fully respected” (Article 53, 
Kosovar local government law, 2008). In municipalities where the largest ethnicity 
accounts for less than 90% of the population, there is a “deputy mayor for 
communities” and a “deputy chairperson of the municipal assembly for communities” – 
posts that must be filled by individuals of an ethnicity that is a minority within the 
municipality (Articles 54 and 61, Kosovar local government law, 2008). The assembly’s 
deputy chairperson for communities should “serve as formal focal point for addressing 
non-majority communities’ concerns and interests” and should review claims by 
citizens that the municipal assembly’s acts or decisions violate minority rights (Article 
55, Kosovar local government law, 2008). The role of the deputy mayor for 
communities is to assist and advise the mayor on minority issues (Article 61, Kosovar 
local government law, 2008). 
 
The legal framework also contains important provisions relating to language. At the 
most basic level, everyone has the right to “use their language and alphabet freely in 
private and in public” (Article 59, Kosovar constitution, 2008). Likewise, any language 
may be used by private businesses and NGOs, though official languages must be used 
in certain spheres of “legitimate public interests” (Article 29, Kosovar language law, 
2006). MPs all have the right to use their native language and receive interpretation, 
while official parliamentary documents must be published in Albanian and Serbian and 
all laws must be published in Albanian, Serbian, Bosnian and Turkish (Article 5, 
Kosovar language law, 2006). Furthermore, those arrested or detained by police have 
the right to be informed promptly of the reason in a language they understand and, if 
necessary, to a free interpreter in court (Article	  4,	  Kosovar	  communities	   law,	  2008). 
Of particular symbolic importance is the right for personal names to be “registered in 
their original form and in the script of their language” (Article 59, Kosovar constitution, 
2008). In a similar vein, there is a commitment to “affirmative measures” to ensure that 
minority languages are “preserved, maintained and promoted” (Articles	   4.9,	  Kosovar	  communities	   law,	   2008). Other provisions on language include the right to 
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communicate with the Ombudsperson Institution in any language (Article 6, Kosovar 
language law, 2006), a guarantee of medical safety instructions in minority languages (Article	   10.3,	   Kosovar	   communities	   law,	   2008) and a requirement that penal and 
detention institutions “ensure that their staff speaks the language(s) of the greatest 
number of the incarcerated” (Article 18, Kosovar language law, 2006). The constitution 
also requires state broadcast media to include programming in all Kosovo’s languages 
and for a whole Serbian-language television channel to be established (Article 59, 
Kosovar constitution, 2008). 
 
Albanian and Serbian are both official languages with completely equal status 
throughout Kosovo (Article 5, Kosovar constitution, 2008). If a community accounts for 
5% of the population or more in a given municipality, their language is official in that 
municipality, alongside Serbian and Albanian (Article 2.3, Kosovar language law, 
2006). Exceptionally, the municipality of Prizren has Turkish as an official language 
regardless of Turks’ share of the population (Article 2.3, Kosovar language law, 2006). 
Albanian and Serbian can be used equally in all state institutions and public enterprises 
and languages official at municipal level can additionally be used in municipal 
institutions (Articles 4, 7 and 11, Kosovar language law, 2006). This includes the right 
of citizens to use the relevant languages to communicate with and receive services and 
documents from institutions, the right of staff to use any relevant language and the 
publication of official documents in all relevant languages (Articles 4 and 7, Kosovar 
language law, 2006). Official languages have equal status in judicial proceedings 
(Article 12.1, Kosovar language law, 2006) and courts have a duty to issue documents 
in any official language requested by any party to proceedings (Article 14, Kosovar 
language law, 2006). Official status at municipal level also means that public signage 
should include that language alongside Albanian and Serbian (Article 9.2, Kosovar 
language law, 2006). Furthermore, if a community accounts for 3-5% of a 
municipality’s population, their language can be used to communicate with municipal 
authorities (Articles 2.4 and 8, Kosovar language law, 2006).  
 
There are also extensive minority rights in education. Everyone has the right to state 
education in Serbian and Albanian at all levels, while education is to be provided in 
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other languages at pre-school, primary and secondary levels (Article 59, Kosovar 
constitution, 2008). If there are too few pupils to justify a school of a particular 
language locally, the state will offer transport, distance-learning or boarding (Articles 
8.1-8.2, Kosovar communities law, 2008). Furthermore, minorities have the right to 
“establish and manage their own private educational and training establishments for 
which public financial assistance may be granted” (Article 59, Kosovar constitution, 
2008). Of particular note are special dispensations for Serbian-medium schools, 
permitting them to use curricula and textbooks developed by Serbia’s Ministry of 
Education, upon approval by Kosovo’s Ministry of Education (Article 8.5, Kosovar 
communities law, 2008). Curricula and textbooks in other languages are to be 
developed by the Kosovar authorities together with the minority-language educational 
establishments themselves (Article 8.7, Kosovar communities law, 2008). They are to 
include content on the relevant group’s “culture, history and traditions” in addition to 
study of either Albanian or Serbian and the standard subjects taught in Albanian-
medium schools (Articles 8.10 and 8.12, Kosovar communities law, 2008). Universities 
are free to decide for themselves which languages are used for instruction and 
administration (Article 23, Kosovar language law, 2006), but there is a commitment to 
establish “special measures” to ensure minorities “equal access” to higher education 
(Article 8.11, Kosovar communities law, 2008). The university in North Mitrovica 
enjoys special recognition as “an autonomous public institution of higher learning” 
operating in Serbian under the authority of the local municipality (Article 8.6, Kosovar 
communities law, 2008). 
 
There is also a comprehensive and thorough law on discrimination, which makes an 
explicit exception for affirmative action (Kosovar anti-discrimination law, 2004). 
Indeed, the law on communities includes a commitment to use affirmative action “to 
promote full and effective equality in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural 
life, including education, media, health and other public services” (Article 3.4, Kosovar 
communities law, 2008). There is also a constitutional commitment to protect all 
citizens from “threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their 
national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity” (Article 58, Kosovar 
constitution, 2008). Similarly, there is a commitment to “refrain from policies or 
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practices aimed at assimilation” and to actively protect citizens from assimilation 
(Article 58, Kosovar constitution, 2008). Likewise, any measures to reduce the minority 
share of the population in a given area are forbidden (Article 2.3, Kosovar communities 
law, 2008). The criminal code bans incitement of “national, racial, religious or ethnic 
hatred, discord or intolerance” (Article 147, Kosovar criminal code, 2012) and describes 
as “aggravated” any crime motivated by ethnicity, national origin, nationality, language, 
religion or colour (Article 74.2.12, Kosovar criminal code, 2012). 
 
As concerns religion, Kosovo is constitutionally defined as a secular state (Article 8, 
Kosovar constitution, 2008), where religious freedom is guaranteed (Article 38, 
Kosovar constitution, 2008). Religious groups have the right to “independently regulate 
their internal organization, religious activities and religious ceremonies” as well as 
“establish religious schools and charity institutions” (Article 39, Kosovar constitution, 
2008). Furthermore, there is a commitment to protect “religious rites, traditional forms 
of religious life, including monastic life, and religious education […] along with church 
property” (Article 7.4, Kosovar communities law, 2008). There is also a law that 
establishes “special protective zones” with the purpose of protecting Serbian Orthodox 
religious sites and other “historical and cultural sites of special significance” to Serbs 
(Article 1, Kosovar law on special protective zones, 2008). This law means that, in 
specified areas around designated sites, “commercial constructions or development”, 
“public gatherings, recreation and entertainment” and “urbanization of agricultural 
land” require permission of the Serbian Orthodox Church, while “industrial 
construction or development” and “construction or development leading to deforestation 
or pollution of the environment” are prohibited outright (Articles 5-6, Kosovar law on 
special protective zones, 2008). 
 
The constitution enshrines the right of minorities to maintain links with ethnic kin 
abroad (Article 59, Kosovar constitution, 2008). This is furthered by a provision of the 
law on communities that commits Kosovo to “conclude […] agreements with other 
states to encourage and foster cultural, educational and other forms of cross-border 
cooperation” (Article 5.8, Kosovar communities law, 2008). A different provision 
protects the right to receive television and radio broadcasts from abroad (Article 6.6, 
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Kosovar communities law, 2008). Minorities also have “the right to celebrate freely and 
publicly their traditional and religious holidays” (Article 5.5, Kosovar communities law, 
2008). Toponyms must “reflect and [be] sensitive to the multi-ethnic and multi-
linguistic character of the area” (Article 59, Kosovar constitution, 2008). The right to 
“use and display community symbols” is also protected. (Article 59, Kosovar 
constitution, 2008). Kosovo is even required to provide financial support to minorities’ 
“cultural initiatives” (Article 58, Kosovar constitution, 2008). Perhaps most unusually, 
the constitution names the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination as “directly applicable” in Kosovo (Article 22, Kosovar 
constitution, 2008) and later states commitment to “respect the standards set forth in” 
the FCNM and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Article 58, 
Kosovar constitution, 2008). 
 
In summary, Kosovo’s legal framework is exemplary of international minority rights 
norms, clearly influenced by recognized best practices. All four elements of Lijphart’s 
definition of consociationalism are present: minorities are guaranteed representation in 
parliament and inclusion in government; minority MPs can veto constitutional 
amendments and other key legislation; quotas are endorsed to ensure ethnic 
proportionality in state institutions; and extensive decentralization permits a 
considerable degree of localized self-government. Furthermore, numerous measures, 
especially concerning language, aim to facilitate minorities’ everyday lives and even to 
maintain links with their kin states, while other provisions serve to symbolically include 
and accommodate minority groups.  
 
4.2.3. Comparison and discussion 
 
The difference in legislation and institutions between Abkhazia and Kosovo is striking. 
Kosovo provides extensive minority rights and allows no trace of ethnocentrism in its 
legislation. In Abkhazia, on the other hand, the picture is mixed: Abkhaz are clearly 
privileged over other groups and there is little in the way of minority rights, with the 
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notable exception of education. Furthermore, in Abkhazia, Russian is effectively 
acknowledged as a lingua franca. 
 
The greatest divergence can be seen in relation to government. In line with 
consociationalism, Kosovo’s constitution is clearly designed to include minorities in 
politics, guaranteeing parliamentary seats to them and endowing their MPs with an 
effective veto over constitutional amendments and much other legislation, as well as 
creating various committees and bodies to deal with minority issues. In stark contrast, 
Abkhazia’s legal framework apparently aims to exclude minorities from political life. 
Not only is there an absence of special measures to include minorities, but there is an 
explicit prohibition of non-Abkhaz serving as president and the requirement for all MPs 
to speak Abkhaz can be understood as an indirect measure to exclude minorities from 
parliament, considering how few non-Abkhaz know the language. 
 
The contrast is also marked in relation to citizenship. Not only does Abkhazian 
legislation explicitly employ ethnicity as a criterion, granting citizenship to all Abkhaz 
and Abazins, but by only extending citizenship to those non-Abkhaz resident in 
Abkhazia in 1999, it excludes the great numbers who fled during the 1992-1993 and 
1998 wars. Kosovar citizenship, in contrast, is constitutionally guaranteed not only to 
those who were living in Kosovo in 2008, but also to those resident in Kosovo before 
the 1998-9 war. Although this does exclude those who left Kosovo during the 
uncertainty and turbulence of the 1980s and 1990s, this is mitigated by the right of all 
born in Kosovo (and their children) to naturalize if they still have family in Kosovo. It 
is also highly significant that Kosovar legislation unconditionally permits dual 
citizenship, while Abkhazia unconditionally allows dual citizenship to Abkhaz and 
Abazins, but only allows others dual Russian-Abkhazian citizenship. The right to retain 
Serbian citizenship increases the sense of security among Kosovar Serbs, Roma and 
Gorani, reducing the risk involved in obtaining Kosovar documents and not forcing 
them to definitively choose allegiance. This means that even those opposed to Kosovar 
independence may hold citizenship, allowing them to integrate into Kosovar life. In 
contrast, Abkhazia’s Georgians and Armenians can only benefit from Abkhazian 
citizenship if they are willing to forego the right to freely live and travel in their kin 
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states, not to mention symbolically severing allegiance with those nations. Those 
unwilling to make these sacrifices are left either unable to live in Abkhazia, or 
marginalized and disenfranchised.  
 
Abkhazian and Kosovar legislation both provide for state-funded education in all 
minority languages. However, unlike Abkhazia, Kosovo also allows minority-language 
schools to include lessons on relevant ethnic history and culture. Moreover, Kosovar 
legislation grants scope for Serbian-language schools to employ textbooks and curricula 
from Serbia, allowing Serbs to maintain robust links with their kin state and firmly 
preventing education from becoming a tool of assimilation. No such concession is 
granted to Abkhazia’s minorities. Another important language issue is the media, with 
Kosovo pledging support to minority-language media while Abkhazia requires both 
state and private media outlets to use Abkhaz. 
 
When it comes to the languages in use in government and state institutions, Kosovo 
gives absolutely equal status to Albanian and Serbian. In a sense, Abkhazia is not too 
dissimilar, giving almost equal status to Abkhaz and Russian (the privileging of Abkhaz 
over Russian being more symbolic than practical). However, despite Armenians and 
Georgians both accounting for a greater share of the population in Abkhazia than Serbs 
in Kosovo, there is no scope for use of their languages. In contrast, even Kosovo’s 
smaller minorities have the right to use their languages in local institutions in the 
municipalities where they live in significant numbers.  
 
An important symbolic issue is that while Kosovo allows citizens of all ethnicities to 
have their names spelt in their native language in official documents – including Cyrillic 
script for Serbs – Abkhazia prescribes Abkhaz spelling, with no scope for the Georgian 
or Armenian alphabets, or even use of Russian spelling rules. Similarly, Kosovar 
legislation goes to lengths to ensure that public signage is always in both Albanian and 
Serbian, as well as the languages of minorities present locally, whereas Abkhazia only 
mandates signs in Abkhaz, and does not allow for signs in Georgian or Armenian at all. 
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Overall, it is fairly clear that international norms have had decisive influence on 
Kosovar law but little effect on the law of Abkhazia. As with the divergence in rhetoric 
discussed in Chapter 4.1.3, the difference in legislation between the two cases is best 
explained by their contrasting relationships with international society. It is hypothesized 
that greater international engagement results in legislation that more closely complies 
with international norms. As with rhetoric, there are two plausible causal mechanisms 
here. The first is that of material incentives. The second is the direct role of international 
actors in drafting legislation. Kosovo’s constitution is directly based on Martti 
Ahtisaari’s recommendations and foreign experts are available to advise Kosovar 
lawmakers on the drafting of any new legislation. Meanwhile, Abkhazian legislation is 
drafted without direct involvement or influence from external actors. In these 
circumstances, the gulf between the two cases is hardly surprising. 
 
4.3. Situation on the ground 
 
4.3.1. Abkhazia 
 
Abkhazia’s ethnic make-up has been the subject of much dispute since the end of the 
Soviet Union. The last figures that are generally accepted as accurate date back to the 
last Soviet census of 1989, which showed Abkhazia’s population as 46% Georgian, 
18% Abkhaz, 15% Armenian, 14% Russian and 3% Greek (International Crisis Group, 
2010, p. 8). It is widely agreed that since then mass emigration has increased the 
Abkhaz proportion of the population, but there is no agreement on the extent of this 
(Trier, Lohm, & Szakonyi, 2010, pp. 139–40). The official results of the 2003 census 
give the population as 44% Abkhaz, 21% Armenian, 20% Georgian, 11% Russian and 
1% Greek (Lenz, 2011). The 2011 census shows 51% Abkhaz, 19% Georgian, 17% 
Armenian, 9% Russian and 1% Greek (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2011). However, analysis by 
Lenz (2011) has shown that the 2003 and 2011 results cannot both be correct, as the 
growth in Abkhaz population (from 94,606 to 122,069) is much higher than can 
realistically be accounted for by natural population growth or immigration. Comai and 
Venturi (2015, p. 886) conclude that, as of their time of writing, “Abkhaz are most 
probably a plurality, but not a majority”. In addition to the groups mentioned, there are 
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also small, largely Russified communities of other ethnicities, such as Ukrainians, 
Estonians and Ossetians. 
 
Armenians are largely concentrated in the Gagra Region, where they constitute the 
plurality, and Sukhumi Region (excluding Sukhumi itself), where they form the 
majority (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2082). Rural Armenians mostly live in mono-
ethnic villages, especially in central and eastern Abkhazia, while urban Armenians are 
more integrated with other groups (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2082). Small numbers 
of Georgians live throughout Abkhazia (O’Loughlin et al., 2011, p. 14), but the vast 
majority live in Gali Region,18 close to the Georgian border (International Crisis Group, 
2013, p. 3). Gali’s population is almost entirely Georgian and so has little contact with 
other ethnicities (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 13). Most Georgians outside Gali 
are either elderly or are married to non-Georgians and well integrated with other groups 
(International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 9). Russians are mostly concentrated in the capital 
and in coastal resort towns in the northwest of the country (Ethno-Kavkaz, n.d.). The 
remaining Greeks, mostly elderly, are concentrated in Sukhumi (de Waal, 2002). 
 
As of 2016, around 8,000 members of the Abkhaz and Abazin diasporas have been 
granted Abkhazian citizenship and some 3,500 are residing in Abkhazia (Dzutsati, 
2016). Most of these migrants have come from Turkey. Since the Syrian Civil War 
started in 2011, the Abkhazian government has helped some 500-550 Abkhaz and 
Abazins from Syria migrate to Abkhazia. Despite receiving significant aid and support 
from the Abkhazian government, 150-200 of these Syrians have already left, citing 
difficulties integrating, lack of work and low living standards (Pender & Aedy, 2017).   
 
Abkhaz overwhelmingly dominate politics. From 2012 to 2017, out of a total of 35 
MPs, 31 were Abkhaz, three were Armenians, one was Georgian and none were 
Russian (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 53). From 2007 to 2012, there were 27 
Abkhaz, three Armenians, three Russians and two Georgians (International Crisis 
Group, 2010, p. 10). In both cases all minorities were underrepresented relative to their 
share of the population, except Russians 2007-2012, whose number of seats was 
                                                
18 Henceforth the word Gali refers to Gali Region and not to its eponymous town. 
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proportional to their population. Non-Abkhaz are particularly underrepresented in the 
higher echelons of government. For example, when David Iradyan was appointed 
Minister for the Economy in 2011, this was the first time in almost a decade that an 
Armenian had held a ministerial post (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2077). At the local 
level in Gali, very few Georgians hold administrative positions (International Crisis 
Group, 2013, p. 20). 
 
It has been suggested that non-Abkhaz may be able to play a role as kingmakers, 
choosing to vote as ethnic blocs to support a particular Abkhaz faction. In apparent 
recognition of this, in his 2009 presidential campaign, Sergei Bagapsh focused his 
activities almost exclusively on areas with large Armenian and Russian populations 
(Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2086). Similarly, at least until 2014, the Georgian vote 
had significantly impact on election outcomes and was courted accordingly 
(Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 52). However, the authorities have responded 
negatively to attempts by non-Abkhaz to wield influence in this way. In 2011, after 
Abkhazia’s main Armenian organization backed Sergei Shamba’s unsuccessful bid for 
the presidency, newly elected president Aleksandr Ankvab forced the organization to 
change its leader (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2085). Moreover, the 2014 decision to 
revoke many Georgians’ citizenship served to drastically reduce that community’s 
voting power (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 52). 
 
Non-Abkhaz are also underrepresented in the judiciary, the prosecution and law 
enforcement. As of July 2017, it is reported that among Abkhazia’s judges, 35 are 
Abkhaz, three are Russian and one is Armenian (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 20, 
53). Although Russians and Armenians are reasonably well represented among police 
officers, there are none running the Ministry of Interior (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, 
p. 53). In a 2010 survey, just over half of Abkhaz and Armenians, 41% of Russians and 
26% of Georgians expressed trust in the police (O’Loughlin et al., 2011, p. 23). The 
ethnic neutrality of the courts is questionable, as it is reported that rulings in sensitive 
cases are often influenced by Abkhaz public opinion, which is determined by a strong 
sense of familial and ethnic loyalty (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 21–22). 
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Implementation of legislation encouraging use of Abkhaz at the expense of other 
languages has been slow and patchy, largely due to the fact that less than half of the 
population speak Abkhaz. For example, as of 2015, parliament and government 
continue to hold their sessions in Russian (Comai & Venturi, 2015, p. 897). Most of the 
population consume media produced in Russia, while media produced locally mainly 
use Russian anyway (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 28–29). For non-Abkhaz this 
non-implementation is largely positive, allowing them to continue to participate in 
public life. 
 
According to the Ministry of Education, during the 2016-2017 academic year there were 
156 schools in Abkhazia, with the official medium of instruction Abkhaz in 59, Russian 
in 57, Armenian in 25 and Abkhaz and Russian bilingually in 15 (Hammarberg & 
Grono, 2017, p. 34). In the 2013-2014 academic year, there were 165 schools, with the 
medium of instruction Abkhaz in 60, Russian in 47, Armenian in 31, Abkhaz and 
Russian in 16 and Georgian in 11 (Apsnypress, 2013). Both sets of data show that the 
share of schools teaching in Armenian matches the Armenian share of the population, 
while the proportion of Russian-medium schools is much greater than the Russian 
percentage of the population. Abkhaz and Abkhaz/Russian schools together account for 
a slightly smaller proportion of schools than the official Abkhaz share of the population 
(although potentially significantly higher than the true share). Georgian-medium 
schools are much fewer than the Georgian proportion of the population would suggest. 
It should be noted that as different schools can be radically different sizes, the number 
of establishments in itself does not tell the whole story. In particular, the fact that as few 
as a quarter of Armenians are said to attend Armenian-medium schools (Comai & 
Venturi, 2015, p. 897) suggests that the Armenian schools must on average have 
significantly fewer pupils than schools operating in other languages.  
 
Comparing the two sets of figures reveals two important changes. Firstly, the numbers 
reflect an ongoing decline in the number of Armenian schools. By all accounts, this is 
due to lack of interest from Armenians rather than any shortcoming in the system. Most 
Armenian parents choose to send their children to Russian-medium schools for the 
simple reason that they believe this will give them better opportunities in life (Kolstø & 
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Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2083). The second and more striking change reflected is 2015’s 
forced Russification of Abkhazia’s 11 remaining Georgian-medium schools – all of 
which were in the southern part of Gali, close to the Georgian border (Hammarberg & 
Grono, 2017, pp. 34–36). The official reason given for this change was that education in 
Russian will help Georgians integrate into life in Abkhazia. As many of the teachers had 
limited grasp of Russian, they were given preparatory language courses for two months 
prior to the switch. Needless to say, for many teachers this was insufficient preparation 
to teach effectively. It is reported that in practice some Georgian is still used to help 
children learn, but nonetheless the pupils have struggled with the transition and their 
learning progress has slowed considerably. The schools have been subject to 
compliance checks by state officials and law enforcement officers, who have on 
occasion searched pupils’ bags for Georgian-language books, creating an atmosphere of 
intimidation (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 37). Georgian language and literature 
have continued to be taught in these schools as distinct subjects, usually for three hours 
per week. Within 12 months of the switch, some 60 children reportedly transferred to 
schools in Georgia. In some cases this meant children moving away from their parents 
to live with other relatives, while in other cases it entails daily border crossings. 
 
Before the change, these 11 schools in lower Gali essentially used the curriculum and 
textbooks from Georgia. In fact, these schools were not integrated into the Abkhazian 
system at all until 2005 and only started issuing Abkhazian diplomas in 2007 
(Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 35). All Georgian-medium schools in other parts of 
the country were Russified in 1994 (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 34). In some of 
these schools, even elective classes on Georgian language and literature have been 
abolished.  
 
Abkhazia’s Russian- and Armenian-medium schools use textbooks and curricula from 
Russia and Armenia respectively, with the addition of classes on Abkhazian history and 
Abkhaz language (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 34–35). Hammarberg and Grono 
(2017, p. 35) describe the Armenian-medium schools as “a good example of a well-
functioning multilingual model”, highlighting the use of Armenian as the main language 
combined with comprehensive study of Russian and Abkhaz. Nonetheless, they report 
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that some Armenians want bilingual use of Armenian and Russian as media of 
instruction. It should be noted that Armenian-medium schools function well partly 
thanks to funding from the Armenian diaspora. 
 
Over 200,000 Georgians left Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war, but only around 
45,000-55,000 have returned (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 38). This is largely 
because Georgians have only been permitted to return to Gali. Abandoned homes were 
occupied and looted en masse during the conflict, mostly by Abkhaz, and few have been 
returned to their pre-war owners (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 39). This problem 
affects Georgians, Russians and Greeks. Those few cases when Abkhazian courts have 
upheld the property rights of non-Abkhaz have caused resentment among the Abkhaz 
public and in many cases remain unimplemented (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 40). 
 
Many non-Abkhaz returnees have been unable to obtain citizenship (Hammarberg & 
Grono, 2017, p. 54). This problem is particularly acute among Gali Georgians, who 
until 2006 could not generally acquire Abkhazian citizenship at all. A 2010 survey 
showed that Abkhazian passports were held by almost all Abkhaz and around 80% of 
Armenians and Russians, but only just over half of Georgians (O’Loughlin et al., 2011, 
p. 21). Between 2006 and 2013, around 22,000 Gali Georgians renounced citizenship of 
Georgia and received Abkhazian passports. The remainder either used old Soviet 
documents with a special stamp from the Abkhazian authorities, or an Abkhazian-issued 
document known as Form n.9. Until 2013, both the passport stamp and Form n.9 
allowed bearers to cross the Abkhazian-Georgian border and to vote in Abkhazian 
elections, without formally conferring Abkhazian citizenship. However, in 2013 all 
passports issued to Gali Georgians since 2006 were declared invalid. From 2013 to 
2017, the only document Gali Georgians could get was Form n.9, which now merely 
enables holders to cross the conflict line. The issuance of these documents required a 
lengthy and unreliable process and often entailed bribery. In 2017 the authorities 
stopped issuing Form n.9 altogether and Gali Georgians were required to apply for 
residency permits. In short, Gali Georgians’ legal status in Abkhazia is unclear and 
precarious and there are concerns they could eventually be treated as foreigners 
(Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 58–60).  
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Those in Abkhazia who lack Abkhazian citizenship face several restrictions. Most 
significantly, they are unable to acquire property other than through inheritance. This 
inhibits their ability to move to different parts of the country and even prevents parents 
giving legal ownership of their homes to their children before they die. It also dissuades 
those without property in Abkhazia from returning. Non-citizens are also unable to 
register births or marriages in Abkhazia, meaning they have to go to Georgia to do so. 
They cannot work in the civil service, prosecution or local administration and since 
2014 they have been unable to vote or run for election. They also face problems in 
education: in practice they can enrol in schools, but it is not certain that this is 
technically allowed. Some have succeeded in enrolling at Abkhazian State University, 
but many have been rejected due to their status (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 56–
57, 61–63). 
 
Gali Georgians face various other issues. In some respects their situation has shown 
improvement and in other respects deterioration. Prior to mid-2012, Gali was often 
described as “lawless” and was plagued by violence from Georgian militias and 
criminal gangs of various ethnicities (International Crisis Group, 2013, pp. 18–19). 
Since then, there has been a decrease in criminal activity and improvement in the 
security situation (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 58). Another positive development 
is that many Georgians now regularly travel to Sukhumi for trade, work and 
administrative purposes – something that was unthinkable in the 1990s due to perceived 
safety concerns (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 51). In contrast, since 2008 it has 
become increasingly difficult to cross the Abkhazian-Georgian border other than at 
official crossing points, a fact that has reduced Gali Georgians’ freedom of movement 
into Georgia (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 58). Abkhazia countered this by 
establishing six crossing points by 2013, but in 2016-2017 three of these points were 
closed, a move that has had a particularly severe impact on the inhabitants of lower Gali 
(Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 64–65). Even when there were six open border 
crossings, for some children attending school across the border, the nearest crossing 
point was as much as 10km away. Such children mostly cross where there is no official 
crossing, thereby facing the threat of being detained or turned back by border guards 
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(Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, pp. 66–67). Around half of local law enforcement 
officers are Georgian, but nonetheless residents show low trust in the police, accusing 
them of corruption (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 19). 
 
Hammarberg and Grono (2017, p. 53) mention that Armenians “are said to be in the 
lead” in “small and medium business and trade”, but they do not go into more detail on 
the matter. Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2013, p. 2088) report that Armenians themselves 
feel that they are doing better economically than Abkhaz, particularly due to their 
involvement in the lucrative tourist industry. Kolstø and Blakkisrud also mention the 
possibility of an unspoken contract whereby the Abkhaz who dominate the state agree 
not to interfere in Armenian business as long as Armenians stay out of politics. 
However, they point out that Armenian preponderance is limited to small and medium 
businesses, with Abkhaz totally dominating major enterprises. In a 2010 survey, 
Abkhaz reported marginally higher satisfaction with their financial situation than 
Armenians and Russians, while Georgians were significantly less satisfied than the 
others (O’Loughlin et al., 2011, p. 17). 
 
Armenians and Russians generally perceive Abkhazia as open and welcoming in the 
context of everyday life and describe inter-ethnic relations as good (Hammarberg & 
Grono, 2017, p. 51). In a 2010 survey, around 80% of Armenians and Russians said 
they never felt discriminated against, compared to around half of Georgians 
(O’Loughlin et al., 2011, p. 21). However, paradoxically, in the same survey only 
around 40-45% of Georgians, Armenians and Russians said that non-Abkhaz 
“probably” or “definitely” had the opportunity for “well-paid jobs and significant posts” 
(O’Loughlin et al., 2011, p. 24). There have been reports of street-level discrimination 
and harassment against Armenians as well as of exclusion from state jobs and 
discrimination in the judicial system (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2013, p. 2078). There have 
also been cases of Abkhaz harassing elderly Russians into selling their homes and 
leaving Abkhazia (Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 41). There is a sentiment among 
many Georgians, Russians and Armenians that Abkhaz have a privileged position in the 
eyes of the law and Georgians in particular complain of having a second-class status 
(Hammarberg & Grono, 2017, p. 51). Continuing ethnic tensions are reflected in a 2010 
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survey, which shows low readiness across the board to forgive other ethnic groups for 
violence committed in 1992-1993, especially among Abkhaz (O’Loughlin et al., 2011, 
p. 27). Similarly, in the same survey Abkhaz, Armenians and Russians overwhelmingly 
agreed with the statement that “among those displaced by war, there are people who 
should not be allowed to come back to Abkhazia” – which would have been understood 
by most respondents as a reference to Georgians (O’Loughlin et al., 2011, p. 28). 
 
4.3.2. Kosovo 
 
According to the best recent estimates, Kosovo’s population is around 87% Albanian, 
8% Serb, 2% Roma, Ashkali or Egyptian,19 2% Bosniak or Gorani20 and 1% Turkish 
(ECMI Kosovo, 2013). There are also a few hundred individuals who identify as Croats 
and Montenegrins respectively. The vast majority of Serbs live in settlements where 
they are the dominant group: around 85% live in Serb-majority municipalities, while 
about half live in the four Serb-majority municipalities north of the Ibar River21 (ECMI 
Kosovo, 2013, pp. 18–19). The largest concentration of Serbs south of the Ibar is in 
Gračanica, just 10km east of Prishtina. The average age of Serbs is the highest of any 
                                                
19 Ashkali and Egyptians are Albanian speakers of Roma origin who since the 1990s have come to 
identify as distinct groups. Egyptian ethnogenesis resulted from exclusion by Albanians and a desire to 
escape anti-Roma sentiment. Ashkali identity emerged for the same reasons, but was adopted by those 
who wanted to emphasize loyalty to Albanians and distance themselves from the Egyptian movement, 
which was perceived by many as pro-Serbian. Furthermore, the structure of the Kosovar political system 
and the policies of IGOs have created incentives for these communities to organize as separate groups. 
(Lichnofsky, 2013) 
20 The line between Bosniaks and Gorani is not clear-cut and is partly political. In Yugoslavia, all Slavic 
Muslims had their ethnicity simply classified as Muslim. In the 1990s, some of those in Kosovo followed 
the example of Bosnia’s Muslims and started identifying as Bosniaks, while others emphasized their 
unique local dialect and declared themselves a distinct ethnicity, Gorani. Although there is a tendency for 
those with their origins in Gora region (the southernmost part of Dragash municipality) to identify as 
Gorani while those whose ancestors came to Kosovo from Bosnia or Sanjak identify as Bosniak, there is 
also a tendency whereby those supporting Kosovo’s independence identify as Bosniak and those 
opposing it identify as Gorani. (Cocozzelli, 2008, pp. 290–294) 
21 These are North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zvečan and Zubin Potok. Henceforth they are referred to as 
North Kosovo. 
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group, much higher than the Kosovar average. Bosniaks and Gorani mostly live in the 
south of Kosovo: 58% of Bosniaks and 6% of Gorani live in Prizren municipality, 
where together they account for 10% of the population, while 82% of Gorani and 14% 
of Bosniaks live in Dragash municipality, where they make up 39% of the population 
(ECMI Kosovo, 2013, pp. 24–25, 52). There is also a notable Gorani population in 
North Mitrovica and a significant Bosniak population in Peć. The Gorani and Bosniak 
populations are considerably older than the Kosovar average (ECMI Kosovo, 2013, pp. 
25, 53). The largest concentration of Turks is in Prizren, where they account for 5% of 
the population. Kosovo also has one Turkish-majority municipality, centred on the 
village of Mamusha, plus a significant number of Turks also reside in Prishtina, where 
they make up 1% of the population (ECMI Kosovo, 2013, p. 29). Turks are slightly 
older than the Kosovar average (ECMI Kosovo, 2013, p. 30). Roma, Ashkali and 
Egyptians (RAE) are spread throughout Kosovo. The municipalities with the largest 
populations are Prizren (which is 4% RAE), Gjakova (7% RAE), Kosovo Polje (12% 
RAE), Peć (4% RAE) and Ferizaj (4% RAE) (ECMI Kosovo, 2013, pp. 35, 41, 47). 
They are considerably younger than the Kosovar average (ECMI Kosovo, 2013, pp. 36, 
42, 48). 
 
In line with the relevant legislation, as of the 2017 parliamentary elections non-
Albanians hold 20 seats in parliament, meaning they are overrepresented relative to 
their share of Kosovo’s population (Zeqiri et al., 2017). Since the declaration of 
independence, minorities have never been underrepresented in parliament. Similarly, 
minorities have consistently held ministerial posts, as prescribed by law (OSCE, 2015, 
p. 21). Importantly, non-Albanian MPs report that they exert real influence on decision-
making (Lončar, 2015, p. 366). Furthermore, they say that their presence in parliament 
reduces their communities’ distrust of Kosovar institutions and helps them feel more 
included in Kosovar society (Lončar, 2015, p. 365).  
 
However, it is reported that there is little co-operation between Albanian and non-
Albanian MPs and that Serb MPs in particular rarely communicate with their Albanian 
counterparts outside of the plenary hall (Lončar, 2015, p. 368). Non-Albanian MPs 
mostly influence policy through international actors – whose help they reportedly seek 
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on almost all issues – rather than by directly engaging with Albanian MPs (Lončar, 
2015, p. 366). Furthermore, many Albanian MPs feel that minority MPs abuse their 
powers, using their veto to block the policy-making process and the threat thereof as 
leverage to gain concessions (Lončar, 2015, p. 365). This perception has a negative 
effect on inter-ethnic relations, causing resentment. Moreover, many Albanian MPs 
believe that the minority MPs use their position to advance their personal interests 
rather than the interests of their communities. They claim that ethnic minorities 
themselves are aware of this, which leads them to be disillusioned with the system 
(Lončar, 2015, p. 367).  
 
It should also be mentioned that since 2013 the vast majority of Serb MPs have come 
from the Serb List (Srpska lista), a Kosovar party with close ties to Serbia’s governing 
party, the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka). Indeed, the Serb List is 
often said to be under Belgrade’s control. The electoral success of the Serb List is at 
least partly due to pressure they put on Kosovar Serbs. Specifically, employees of 
parallel institutions (see below) are obliged to vote for them or risk losing their jobs 
(Zeqiri & Arsić, 2017). This means that Serbs lack genuine democratic representation. 
Furthermore, as Serb List MPs usually do not constructively engage with Kosovar 
institutions or Albanian MPs, their presence in parliament does little to further Serbs’ 
integration (Zeqiri & Arsić, 2017).  
 
Beyond parliament, the CCC is quite active, issuing recommendations to institutions on 
issues of relevance to minorities and reviewing draft laws. However, MPs do not 
systematically consult the CCC in the early stages of legislation and policy development 
and when they do consult it, this is often only due to prompting by IGOs. Furthermore, 
the CCC does not report to international human rights mechanisms as foreseen by law, 
nor does it make significant efforts to engage with the communities it is supposed to 
represent (OSCE, 2015, p. 21). As at the central level, municipal governments adhere to 
the rules concerning minority representation. However, communities in the minority at 
municipal level have limited meaningful participation in decision-making, with many 
minority representatives playing little more than a tokenistic role (OSCE, 2015, p. 22). 
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A 2014 survey about Serbs’ and Albanians’ views of one another reveals massive ethnic 
distance between the two groups. While 80.2% of Albanians and 74.2% of Serbs would 
accept members of the other ethnicity as neighbours, just 57.6% of Albanians and 
50.6% of Serbs would accept a member of the other ethnicity as a boss and a mere 
15.7% of Albanians and 12.3% of Serbs would accept them as a spouse (Jović, 2015, 
pp. 263–264). Similarly, just 14.5% of Albanians and 7.5% of Serbs would send their 
child to a school where the majority of pupils were of the other ethnicity (Jović, 2015, 
p. 267). There is little age-based variation in these responses, with attitudes just as 
negative among the younger generation as among those who lived through the war 
(Jović, 2015, p. 265). This inter-ethnic animosity results in low support for minority 
rights. Just 49.6% of Serbs and 20.7% of Albanians think the Albanian and Serbian 
languages should have equal status in Kosovo, while just 56.7% of Serbs and 56.2% of 
Albanians think non-Albanians should be in Kosovo's parliament (Jović, 2015, p. 
268).22 The survey not only shows negative opinions, but also physical separation: 
50.6% of Albanians report having no contact whatsoever with Serbs and 35.9% of Serbs 
say they have no contact with Albanians (Jović, 2015, p. 266). Only a tiny minority of 
Serbs regularly travel to Albanian-majority areas for work or education (Fridman, 2015, 
p. 175)  
 
Similarly, the OSCE (2015, p. 4) writes of a “lack of interaction and dialogue among 
communities” and “limited expression of tolerance in society”. At both central and 
municipal level, there have been few efforts to bring citizens of different ethnicities 
together or to otherwise promote tolerance and diversity, and those initiatives that have 
been undertaken have been predominantly donor-driven (OSCE, 2015, p. 6). The 
Working Group on Dealing with the Past and Reconciliation has failed to meet 
regularly, has experienced very little participation from minorities and has been 
generally unproductive (OSCE, 2015, p. 6). 
 
                                                
22 The low number of Serbs in favour of non-Albanians joining parliament presumably reflects an 
outright rejection of Kosovar institutions, rather than a belief that their own community should not have 
political representation. 
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Crimes with apparent ethnic motivation remain common, particularly against Serbs, 
including theft, physical assault, verbal assault, threats, vandalism and hate speech 
(OSCE, 2015, p. 9). An especially common issue is vandalism against religious and 
cultural sites, with Serbian Orthodox sites disproportionately affected (OSCE, 2015, p. 
32). Kosovo is unable to appropriately address such crime, as the police do not 
systematically and reliably record whether crimes are ethnically motivated (OSCE, 
2015, p. 11). As such, there is an impression among minorities that the perpetrators of 
hate crime enjoy impunity (European Commission, 2016, p. 29). That said, in areas 
where attacks against non-Albanians have been repeatedly reported, the police have 
increased their presence and installed surveillance cameras (OSCE, 2015, p. 11). The 
police make use of community liaison officers to maintain regular contact with 
minorities and have attempted to recruit non-Albanians, though some minority groups 
remain underrepresented (OSCE, 2015, p. 13). 
 
Of the 220,000 persons displaced outside of Kosovo by the 1999 conflict and the 2004 
riots, only 26,098 have returned (OSCE, 2015, p. 29). Moreover, the rate of returns has 
been decreasing annually (European Commission, 2016, p. 29). The question of non-
Albanian returnees is a major source of inter-ethnic tension. Albanians often express 
resistance to Serbs and other non-Albanians returning to Albanian-majority settlements 
and even to non-Albanians coming to these settlements to visit relatives’ graves (OSCE, 
2015, p. 7). In addition to isolated acts of violence, vandalism and intimidation, there 
have also been concerted campaigns to petition the authorities to block returns (OSCE, 
2015, p. 31). In the majority of locations where the local population has expressed such 
resistance to returnees, the authorities have taken little or no action to mediate or 
otherwise support the return process (OSCE, 2015, p. 9). Furthermore, there is a huge 
backlog of court cases relating to the property rights of displaced persons (OSCE, 2015, 
p. 13). Even when courts come to decisions on property cases, there is often weak 
enforcement of rulings, leaving displaced persons unable to reclaim their former homes 
(OSCE, 2015, p. 15). Displaced RAE have faced particularly difficult conditions. 
Notably, RAE displaced from Mitrovica were left in makeshift camps outside the city 
for over a decade (Hopkins, 2016). Not only was this much longer than most IDPs of 
other ethnicities had to live in camps, but the RAE camps were knowingly built on lead-
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contaminated land and had dangerously poor sanitary conditions, with many residents 
suffering serious health consequences (Rorke, 2016). 
 
In many ways, Kosovar Serbs have stronger social and political ties to Serbia than to 
Kosovo (Limani, 2015, p. 355). This is particularly the case in North Kosovo, from 
which one can relatively quickly and easily go to Serbia (Lončar, 2015, p. 367). Serb-
populated areas throughout Kosovo have Serbian state institutions known as “parallel 
structures”, which are illegal under Kosovar law. These institutions include local 
government, healthcare and schools. Until 2013, these were the only institutions in 
North Kosovo, whereas in the rest of the country they existed alongside Kosovar 
institutions (with the exception of education, see below). Until 2013, North Kosovo also 
had Serbian police and a body called Civil Protection (Civilna zaštita), which assisted 
the population in emergencies and also worked on road maintenance, bridge repairs and 
providing security (Stakić & Bjeloš, 2015). Since 2013 Kosovar institutions have been 
gradually introduced in the north, Serbia’s police force has been removed and Civil 
Protection has disbanded, its former members given employment in Kosovar 
institutions (Kosovar Ministry for Dialogue, 2016). Until 2016 the Kosovar justice 
system was completely absent from North Kosovo, where the Serbian judicial system 
was in effect (OSCE, 2015, p. 12). In 2016 Kosovo began preparing for the introduction 
of its judicial institutions in these municipalities by recruiting 44 judges, 34 prosecutors 
and 148 administrative staff, all Serbs (Kosovar Ministry for Dialogue, 2016, p. 4). In 
October 2017 the judiciary in these municipalities was fully integrated into the Kosovar 
system (EEAS, 2017). 
 
Two completely separate educational systems operate in Kosovo: Serbian and Kosovar. 
The Serbian schools operate more or less as if they were in Serbia, following Serbian 
curricula, without input from Kosovar authorities (OSCE, 2015, p. 17). There is no 
formal co-operation between the two systems other than a handful of cases where a 
Serbian and a Kosovar school share the same premises and there are arrangements vis-
à-vis maintenance and utilities (OSCE, 2015, p. 8). Schools from the Kosovar system 
operate in Albanian, Turkish and Bosnian. Turkish- and Bosnian-medium schools are 
generally available to everyone who wants them – even where the number of pupils is 
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less than the required minimum – but there is a lack of Kosovar textbooks in these 
languages, so teachers often rely on imports (OSCE, 2015, pp. 17–18). These schools 
all follow essentially the same curriculum, with additional classes on the relevant ethnic 
history and culture. The Albanian-medium schools offer no opportunity to learn any 
minority languages, while the Turkish- and Bosnian-medium schools offer Albanian as 
an elective subject taught two hours per week, but lack proper training or teaching 
materials for this (OSCE, 2015, pp. 7–8, 19). Schools from the Serbian system all use 
Serbian as their main medium of instruction and none offer the opportunity to learn 
Albanian. Kosovo has no Romani-medium schools, but some schools from both 
systems offer Roma pupils special classes on Romani language, history and culture 
(OSCE, 2015, p. 17). However, there is no proper training available for teachers of 
these classes (OSCE, 2015, p. 19). Neither system offers any schools or classes 
dedicated to Gorani, Croats, Ashkali, Egyptians or Montenegrins (OSCE, 2015, p. 18).23 
 
There is no higher education available in minority languages other than Serbian. 
Serbian-medium education is offered at an institution in North Mitrovica that was 
founded when Serbs from the University of Prishtina relocated there during the war. 
The university operates within the Serbian system and calls itself the University of 
Prishtina (Univerzitet u Prištini), while Kosovar authorities and IGOs refer to it as the 
University in/of North Mitrovica, the University in/of Kosovska Mitrovica or the 
University in/of Mitrovica (OSCE, 2015, p. 19). Due to its non-compliance with 
Kosovar legislation, its degrees are unrecognized by Kosovar institutions, restricting its 
graduates’ employment opportunities. However, since 2015 it has been possible for 
graduates to have their degrees “verified” so that they can apply for jobs in Kosovar 
institutions (CVDIUM, 2016).  
 
                                                
23 This should not be seen as too serious of a shortcoming, considering that Gorani, Croats and 
Montenegrins are very small in numbers and speak essentially the same language as Serbs and Bosniaks, 
while Ashkali and Egyptians speak Albanian and do not really have any history or culture distinct from 
that of Roma. Gorani have the greatest claim to educational accommodation, as their distinct dialect could 
in principle be taught in schools, but this would require extensive work in codification, standardization 
and development of teaching materials. 
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RAE children face various problems in education, including high rates of non-
enrolment and dropouts and low educational achievement. In both school systems they 
face bullying from fellow pupils as well as systematic discrimination, such as 
segregation from children of other ethnicities (OSCE, 2015, p. 18). As a result of these 
issues, RAE have high rates of illiteracy (OSCE, 2015, p. 26). RAE are also highly 
disadvantaged by various other metrics. Perhaps most strikingly, they suffer from high 
rates of malnutrition and their infant mortality rate is around three times as high as the 
Kosovar average (Kosovar Stats Agency, 2014, p. 4). All minorities – but especially 
RAE – have problems with access to public utilities and health services (OSCE, 2015, 
p. 23). For RAE, these issues are often exacerbated by difficulties they face in acquiring 
personal documents (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p. 475). RAE also face serious 
discrimination in all aspects of their lives (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p. 474). As the 
2004 Law on Anti-Discrimination was vague in prescribing enforcement mechanisms, it 
was poorly implemented (OSCE, 2015, p. 28). The 2015 Law on Protection from 
Discrimination addressed these issues, but implementation remains poor due to citizens 
being unaware of their rights (OSCE, 2015, p. 29). With the apparent aim of 
ameliorating the situation of RAE, the government published the “Strategy and Action 
Plan for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo, 2009-
2015”. However, the authorities failed to implement this in a co-ordinated or systematic 
way (OSCE, 2015, p. 25). 
 
As of 2012, Kosovo's overall unemployment rate was 45%. The level was lower among 
Serbs, Bosniaks and Turks, who all had 38% unemployment (ECMI Kosovo, 2013, pp. 
22, 27, 33). The Serb community in North Kosovo, which maintains considerable ties 
with Serbia, is generally wealthier than the more rural Serb population in the rest of the 
country. Unemployment was somewhat higher among Gorani, at 50% (ECMI Kosovo, 
2013, p. 55). Among RAE, the situation was considerably worse: 60% for Roma and 
Ashkali and 80% for Egyptians (ECMI Kosovo, 2013, pp. 39, 44–45, 50). Furthermore, 
Egyptians’ average household income was less than half the Kosovar average, and 
among Roma and Ashkali the income level was even lower.  
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Kosovo’s media is ethnically polarized. Reporting is often biased and incomplete due to 
the fact that journalists generally only use sources from their own community and 
media outlets usually only employ staff of a single ethnicity (OSCE, 2015, p. 7). This 
particularly skews reporting of ethnic issues, where media from different groups often 
present completely divergent narratives (OSCE, 2015, p. 34). Although the constitution 
mandates the establishment of a Serbian-language state television channel, this was only 
achieved in 2013 (OSCE, 2015, p. 34). The resulting channel, RTK2, allocates 15% of 
its programming to languages other than Serbian, most notably Romani. The other state 
channel, RTK1, which broadcasts primarily in Albanian, has special programming 
dedicated to RAE and Turks. There is however no state television dedicated to Bosniaks 
(OSCE, 2015, p. 34). 
 
In a 2015 survey, 67% of non-Albanians expressed lack of trust in Kosovar judicial 
institutions, while 68% voiced the belief that the judicial system lacks equality (OSCE, 
2015, p. 11). This sentiment is lent credence by the fact that non-Albanian defendants 
lack legal representation considerably more often than Albanians (OSCE, 2015, p. 11). 
Minorities are also underrepresented in the judiciary: as of 2015, Kosovo had just five 
non-Albanian prosecutors, none of whom were Gorani or RAE, while just 5% of 
registered lawyers were from minorities (OSCE, 2015, p. 14). Before 2014, UN-funded 
legal aid was provided to many non-Albanians in Mitrovica and Gračanica, but since 
funding ended there has been little legal aid available to the minorities in these areas 
(OSCE, 2015, p. 13). A particularly important issue is that of language in court. Of 105 
criminal cases involving only Serb defendants monitored by the OSCE in 2014, all were 
conducted in Albanian (OSCE, 2015, p. 12). Moreover, in the majority of cases where 
translation is required, it is either not provided or of poor quality (OSCE, 2015, p. 11). 
 
The non-realization of linguistic rights is an issue not just in court, but throughout 
Kosovo. Institutions have been slow to comply with their obligations to provide 
services and documents in different languages, municipal assemblies have been slow to 
introduce simultaneous interpretation and authorities have been slow to introduce bi- 
and multi-lingual signage (OSCE, 2015, p. 15). Furthermore, too few translators and 
interpreters are employed and the number of state employees fluent in Serbo-Croatian is 
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actually decreasing, as only those Albanians educated in Yugoslavia know the language 
(OSCE, 2015, p. 16). Identity cards and civil registry documents are available in 
Turkish, Albanian, Bosnian, Serbian Cyrillic, Serbian Latin and English, but Serbian 
Cyrillic, Bosnian and Turkish only were only introduced in 2015 (OSCE, 2015, p. 15). 
Parliament provides interpretation for Albanian, Serbian and Turkish at all committee 
meetings and plenary sessions and reliably publishes all documents in Albanian and 
Serbian, but there have been numerous cases where the Serbian translations of laws 
have not matched the Albanian versions (OSCE, 2015, p. 16).  
 
4.3.3. Comparison and discussion 
 
At first glance, the situation in government is totally opposite in the two cases: non-
Abkhaz are drastically underrepresented in Abkhazia, while non-Albanians are 
overrepresented in Kosovo. Furthermore, Kosovar minority MPs claim to exercise real 
influence on policy. However, these representatives do not significantly collaborate 
with their Albanian counterparts, but rather contribute to the ethnic segmentation of 
public life. Moreover, reports of low political engagement among Kosovar minorities 
and of representatives disconnected from their constituents raise doubts about the extent 
to which non-Albanians really are represented. Most markedly, Serbs lack true 
democratic representation, as the Serb List secures predominance by putting pressure on 
voters and hounding opposition. As such, it seems that the guaranteed seats in Kosovo’s 
parliament create the appearance of political inclusion, regardless of the level of actual 
involvement of minority communities themselves. The apparently low level of political 
engagement among Kosovar minorities is mirrored among minorities in Abkhazia, who 
have shown general reluctance to become involved in political life and are wary of 
dissenting from Abkhaz popular opinion. In those Kosovar municipalities where non-
Albanians form a majority, they enjoy a significant degree of self-government, unlike in 
Abkhazia, where governance is strongly centralized. However, ethnic groups in 
minority at the municipal level in Kosovo do not exercise much influence on local 
government, just as it is reported that non-Abkhaz are underrepresented at local level in 
Abkhazia.  
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Abkhazia’s total ban on Georgians returning to any region other than Gali stands in 
stark contrast to the official policy in Kosovo, which formally welcomes returnees of all 
ethnicities. However, in practice the returnee situation in the two cases is quite similar: 
in both cases the pace of returns by minorities has been slow, with only small numbers 
of Serbs and RAE having returned to Kosovo and small numbers of Georgians, Greeks 
and Russians having returned to Abkhazia. Furthermore, in Abkhazia the idea of 
Georgians returning meets great resistance from Abkhaz, Armenians and Russians, just 
as Albanians resist the return of Serbs and RAE to Kosovo. Another clear similarity can 
be seen in the slow progress on property cases where Abkhaz and Albanians have 
occupied the homes of minorities. In both countries, the court cases drag on sluggishly 
and when there are rulings in favour of minorities, they are often unimplemented.  
 
A major difference can be seen in citizenship policy. The Abkhazian ban on dual 
citizenship for minorities has no equivalent in Kosovo, which permits dual citizenship 
unconditionally. Likewise, many non-Abkhaz experience difficulties obtaining 
Abkhazian citizenship even if willing to give up other passports, whereas in Kosovo 
there have been no significant complaints of such issues. As a result, large numbers of 
Abkhazia’s Georgians (and some Russians, Armenians and Greeks) have ambiguous 
legal status, are stateless or are aliens. These people face numerous serious restrictions, 
including the inability to vote, run for office, buy property, register births and marriages 
or work in certain spheres. It is true that in Kosovo some RAE experience difficulties 
obtaining identity documents, but these individuals are nonetheless ultimately treated as 
citizens. In general, everyone in Kosovo has been able to acquire citizenship, have they 
wanted to. In a similar vein, Abkhazia has run a concerted campaign to encourage 
immigration by Abkhaz and Abazins from the diaspora, while Kosovo has made no 
open attempt to increase Albanians’ share of the population. However, it should be 
noted that the effects of the Abkhazian “repatriation” campaign have been very limited. 
 
There is a lack of data on the actual prosperity of different Abkhazian ethnic groups, but 
satisfaction with their personal financial situation is somewhat lower among Russians 
and Armenians than among Abkhaz, and considerably lower among Georgians (who are 
largely excluded from various careers due to citizenship). Although Abkhaz dominate 
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large enterprises, Armenians have a firm niche in small business. In Kosovo, Turks, 
Bosniaks and Serbs (or at least the Serbs of North Kosovo) are actually more 
prosperous than Albanians. However, Gorani and RAE are substantially disadvantaged. 
Indeed, no ethnic group in Abkhazia comes close to the level of marginalization faced 
by RAE in Kosovo. 
 
In both cases, minorities are underrepresented in the judiciary, the prosecution and law 
enforcement, especially at higher levels. There has however been some increase in the 
inclusion of minorities during the period studied, particularly in Kosovo but also in 
Abkhazia, where more Gali Georgians have been recruited by the police. In both 
countries, the ethnic neutrality of the courts is under serious doubt, as they are hesitant 
to rule against members of the ethnic majority in ethnically sensitive cases. 
 
A major difference is Abkhazia’s cessation of Georgian-medium education (in most of 
the territory from 1994 and totally since 2015), compared to Kosovo’s firm 
commitment to provide education in all communities’ languages. However, Abkhazia’s 
Armenians and Russians enjoy access to education in the language of their choice, just 
like most Kosovar minorities. In both countries smaller minorities (e.g. Greeks, 
Estonians and Ukrainians in Abkhazia; Gorani, Ashkali, Egyptians and Croats in 
Kosovo) lack their own schooling, but this is largely justified by their small numbers, 
older population and their tendency to speak Russian in Abkhazia and Albanian or 
Serbo-Croatian in Kosovo. Another notable similarity in the sphere of education is the 
lack of locally produced curricula and teaching materials in minority languages. Serb, 
Armenian, Russian and pre-2015 Georgian curricula come entirely from abroad, while 
Bosniak and Turkish schools do use Kosovar curricula but are heavily reliant on 
textbooks from Bosnia and Turkey. The “parallel” nature of the Serb education system 
in Kosovo is unlike anything in Abkhazia during the period studied, but does have 
similarities to how Gali’s Georgian schools functioned prior to 2005. 
 
In Abkhazia, generally, the level of inter-ethnic integration is higher than in Kosovo. 
While Kosovar Serbs continue to use “parallel” Serbian institutions, Abkhazians of all 
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ethnicities make use of the de facto state’s services.24 Significantly, Georgians move 
freely within Abkhazia, frequently and safely travelling to Sukhumi for various 
purposes, while most Kosovar Serbs still do not feel safe leaving their enclaves. 
Especially important in relation to integration and inter-ethnic relations is the fact that in 
Abkhazia there is a high level of bilingualism, whereby Abkhaz, Georgians and 
Armenians know Russian alongside their ethnic languages. As such, Russian serves as 
an ethnically neutral lingua franca, facilitating inter-group communication. Moreover, 
as Abkhazia’s language law remains unimplemented, Russian is the main language of 
government and administration, allowing inclusion of all communities. In contrast, 
Kosovo has seen increasing monolingualism, even among Turks, as members of the 
younger generation do not learn the languages of other communities. Not only does this 
make it difficult for individuals to access services outside of areas where their 
community predominates, but it also severely limits prospects of inter-ethnic 
reconciliation. Of course, the amicability of Abkhazia’s inter-ethnic relations should not 
be overstated: there are credible reports of discrimination and hate crime against 
Russians, Armenians and especially Georgians. Indeed, inter-ethnic relations are poor 
by global standards, especially between Abkhaz and Georgians, but the level of ethnic 
distance and animosity does not appear as great as in Kosovo. 
 
In summary, the situation of minorities is somewhat worse in Abkhazia than in Kosovo, 
but not uniformly so. The situation in Abkhazia is especially bad for Georgians, 
particularly with regards to right of return, acquisition of citizenship and native-
language education. However, on many issues the discrepancy between the two cases is 
not as great as it may seem. The most important example of this is political 
representation: Kosovar minorities have the parliamentary seats and government posts 
that Abkhazian minorities lack, but their actual involvement in policy-making remains 
limited and ordinary non-Albanians remain disconnected from political life. The two 
cases also have a fairly similar situation as concerns education (other than for 
Abkhazia’s Georgians), property rights of displaced persons and representation in the 
judiciary, prosecution and law enforcement. Moreover, the degree of inter-ethnic 
                                                
24 Though due to the rudimentary state of Abkhazia’s public services, many Abkhazians of all ethnicities 
go abroad for serious healthcare and for higher education. 
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integration appears to be greater in Abkhazia than in Kosovo: all communities engage 
with Abkhazian services and institutions; minorities routinely travel freely and safely 
around the territory; far more people live in ethnically mixed settlements; and Russian 
serves as an ethnically neutral lingua franca to facilitate inter-group communication. 
 
Part of the explanation for why the radically different rhetoric and legislation do not 
translate into radically different situations on the ground is non-implementation. Non-
implementation is a recurrent theme in both cases, but its effects are quite different in 
the two countries. In Kosovo un-implemented laws are generally those granting and 
protecting minority rights, so their non-implementation is detrimental to the position of 
non-Albanians. In Abkhazia, on the other hand, legislation intended to strengthen the 
position of the Abkhaz language remains un-implemented, meaning that non-
implementation is actually beneficial to minorities. Similarly, non-implementation of 
the legislation pertaining to education in minority languages means that Armenian- and 
Russian-medium schools continue to use materials and curricula from Armenia and 
Russia, allowing the Armenian and Russian minorities greater cultural links to their kin 
states. This all suggests that non-implementation reduces the gulf between the two 
cases, explaining why markedly divergent legislation leads to fairly similar results. It 
should be noted that there are exceptions to this trend in both cases. In Abkhazia non-
implementation of Georgians’ right to Georgian-medium education is clearly negative 
from the point of view of minority rights. Conversely, implementation of Kosovar 
legislation vis-à-vis Serbian-medium education would probably be perceived negatively 
by Serbs, as it would reduce their ties to Serbia. 
 
A good explanation for the non-implementation of Abkhazian language legislation has 
been proposed by Comai and Venturi (2015). They suggest that the legislation was 
never intended to be fully implemented, but rather that its primary function is symbolic. 
By legally privileging and protecting the Abkhaz language at the expense of other 
languages, the Abkhaz assert their dominance over the polity and strengthen their 
societal position. In other words, the legislation was penned so as shore up the regime’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of a domestic constituency, namely Abkhaz ethnic nationalists.  
As less than half of the population speak Abkhaz, actual full implementation would be 
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highly impractical and yield few benefits to anyone, not even to Abkhaz themselves, 
who are often more comfortable using Russian in spheres such as business and politics, 
only using Abkhaz in informal settings. Furthermore, policy-makers are likely wary that 
full implementation could trigger backlash from ethnic minorities or from Russia. 
 
Non-implementation of Kosovar legislation – i.e. the non-realization of various 
minority rights – may to an extent be explained by lack of resources. Kosovo is one of 
the poorest countries in Europe and it is not cheap to provide simultaneous 
interpretation or high-quality translation of documentation. However, in many cases 
implementation would not incur significant costs. For example, it would cost little for 
the government to regularly consult with the CCC or for municipal assemblies to 
genuinely include minorities in decision-making. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
international donors are very active in Kosovo, making extensive funds available for 
programmes intended to benefit minorities. This would suggest that although lack of 
funds may be a contributing factor, non-implementation of minority rights is largely due 
to absence of political will. 
 
To explain why Kosovo has not fully complied with minority rights norms in practice, 
despite extensive international engagement and faithful compliance on the rhetorical 
and legislative level, it is useful to recall a point made by Casperson (2012). She 
predicts that in de facto states there may be “discrepancy between rhetoric and 
substance” due to “tension between the ‘ethnos’ of self-determination and the ‘demos’ 
of liberal democracy” and due to desire to “please more than one audience at a time” 
(Caspersen, 2012, p. 74). In other words, there is a clash between the demands of 
internal and external legitimacy: the domestic audience demands ethnocentrism, while 
international society demands minority rights. 
 
However, this raises the question of why the power of international norms over Kosovo 
has been enough to make it adopt and maintain a generous legal framework and to 
employ norm-compliant rhetoric, but not enough to actually entrench commitment to 
the values contained therein. Considering the extent of international involvement in 
Kosovo, it cannot reasonably be argued that the level of international engagement was 
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too low. Instead, it is hypothesized that the explanation can be found in the rationalist 
account of norm diffusion, the logic of consequences. If the Kosovar political 
establishment has not internalized the norms in question, but simply complies with them 
to the extent necessary to yield material benefits, the poor realization of minority rights 
can be explained by the policies and practices of the norm promoters.  
 
In particular, it should be noted that the biggest “carrot” – recognition – was already 
given to Kosovo by most Western states promptly after the declaration of independence. 
This has been described as a case of “earned sovereignty” (Hooper & Williams, 2002). 
However, it is clear that Kosovo primarily earned recognition on the basis of its 
impressive legal framework, without needing to prove its willingness and ability to 
translate this legislation into palpable results. Since then, there has been a distinct lack 
of sticks and carrots from the UN or OSCE. From the EU, carrots come in the form of 
grants and, more importantly, promises of a Stabilization and Association Agreement, a 
visa-free deal and eventual membership. However, as highlighted by Muk and Cvijić 
(2018), the EU has tended to shy away from strong criticism of Balkan states, preferring 
to praise them for minor achievements and give the impression that accession is just 
around the corner. For this reason, there has been no incentive for Kosovo to follow 
through on its rhetoric and its legal commitments. 
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5. Conclusion 
  
In Kosovo international minority rights norms appear to have moulded legislation and 
official rhetoric, but they have not penetrated deeply into the actual behaviour of policy-
makers and they have only yielded modest results on the ground. Meanwhile, in 
Abkhazia these norms have had some effect on official rhetoric, but little to none on 
legislation or praxis. In both cases the international norms surrounding tolerance and 
minority rights are reinterpreted to fit pre-existing, ethnocentric narratives and then used 
in legitimation strategies towards international society.  
 
This thesis has generated several hypotheses that could fruitfully be tested by future 
research. It is suggested that greater international engagement results in rhetoric and 
legislation that more closely comply with international norms. For rhetoric, it is 
theorized that greater interaction with international society increases local actors’ 
familiarity with norms, enhancing their ability to use compliance as a legitimation 
strategy, while greater prospects of material reward increase the incentive to use 
compliance as a legitimation strategy. For legislation, the same mechanism is proposed 
vis-à-vis material incentives and it is additionally highlighted that direct involvement of 
international actors in drafting legislation increases norm compliance. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that norms are more likely to be adopted the more compatible they are with 
pre-existing norms and identities. Finally, it is argued that norm-compliant legislation 
and rhetoric will only translate into praxis in the presence of material incentives. 
 
This paper’s findings have important theoretical and practical implications. Firstly, the 
study confirms Epstein’s (2012) argument that scholars of international norms need to 
take into account the nature of those polities that are being socialized, including their 
pre-existing identities and normative frameworks. From a practical perspective, this 
means that a particular norm might be adopted by some polities more quickly than 
others. Specifically, this work highlights the difficulty of instilling full respect for 
diversity and minority rights in plural and deeply divided societies. Even in Kosovo, 
where more effort has been dedicated to this goal than perhaps anywhere else in the 
world, the results have been modest.  
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Another important finding is that despite Abkhazia’s general lack of minority rights and 
at times highly ethnocentric legislation, the situation of Abkhazian minorities is in many 
ways not substantially worse than that of minorities in Kosovo. In particular, it is 
revealed that the presence of an ethnically neutral lingua franca can to an extent serve as 
a substitute for minority language rights. Furthermore, as highlighted by Clogg (2008), 
Ó Beacháin (2012) and Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2013), lack of  minority rights is not 
necessarily objected to by minorities who accept a particular ethnicity as legitimately 
leading the polity. This suggests that scholars and practitioners need to employ a broad, 
flexible approach to ethnic politics, taking account of local particularities and historical 
legacies. 
 
This work supports the rationalist account of norm diffusion: that norm compliance 
depends first and foremost on material incentives. It refutes the idea that norms are 
diffused naturally or automatically across the globe. There is some evidence of such 
norm diffusion, but it is mostly limited to the level of rhetoric, without significant 
influence on legislation or praxis. Therefore, it appears that Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
(1998, p. 906) prediction that polities “insecure about their international status” will 
“embrace new international norms most eagerly and thoroughly” is overly simplistic. 
Similarly, the evidence from Abkhazia does not support Caspersen’s (2012, p. 51) and 
Pegg’s (2017) claims about the influence of international norms on de facto states. 
Instead, this paper’s findings support the view expressed by such scholars as Bradbury 
(2008), Eubank (2012), Philips (2016) and Richards (2014) that de facto states 
neglected by international society are free to pursue policies and forms of statehood that 
would not be recommended by influential IGOs or foreign experts. Specifically, there is 
support for Clogg’s (2008, p. 321) argument that Abkhazia lacks extensive minority 
rights due to lack of international pressure. 
 
In other words, even though de facto states have an overwhelming motivation to seek 
legitimacy, they cannot be relied upon to conform to norms unprompted. This means 
that it is necessary to actively engage de facto states (or indeed ordinary, uncontested 
states) in order to socialize them into particular patterns of behaviour. Correspondingly, 
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boycotting or isolating norm violators is unlikely to be an effective way to encourage 
compliance. Moreover, this study suggests that full compliance with norms will only be 
realized if incentivizing measures are linked to implementation and results, rather than 
to rhetoric or to the adoption of legislation.   
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